

The American Tradition What Remains?

BORIS MARUSHKIN

BORIS MARUSHKIN

THE AMERICAN TRADITION WHAT REMAINS?

(From the War for Independence
to Neocolonialism)

*Novosti Press Agency Publishing House
Moscow, 1975*

© Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1975

Editing completed on April 14, 1975

CONTENTS

Introduction	5
I. Democratic Traditions	10
II. Anti-Democratic Traditions	14
III. Revision of Democratic Heritage	23
IV. The Shaping of the Imperial Tradition	49
V. End of the Omnipotence Illusion	69
VI. The National Liberation Movement: For or Against?	87
Conclusion	99

Introduction

The American Revolution of 1776 was one of those great events which moved history forward and as such is remembered by posterity. Noting the historic importance of the creation of the first independent state on the American continent, Lenin wrote in August 1918: "The history of modern, civilised America opened with one of those great, really liberating, really revolutionary wars of which there have been so few compared to the vast number of wars of conquest which, like the present imperialist war, were caused by squabbles among kings, land-owners or capitalists over the division of usurped lands or ill-gotten gains."¹ Lenin's assessment continues to retain its significance and importance today, two hundred years after the American Revolution, when many other former colonial countries have firmly set out along the road of independence. He emphasises the just, progressive and historically inevitable nature of decolonisation—of the national liberation movements of the peoples formerly oppressed by imperialism.

The bicentenary of the American War for In-

¹ V. Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 28, p. 62.

dependence makes us look back once again at this outstanding historical event. However, in looking back into the past, one should not forget the present.

An extensive propaganda campaign is steadily being mounted in the United States in connection with this anniversary. The aim is to try to convince people that the ruling elite in the U.S. continues to be guided by the ideas of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson—the leaders of the 18th century revolution—and that the ideals of the struggle for independence continue to form the basis of America's policy towards the national liberation movement.

American historians have been giving increasing prominence to the revolutionary past of the United States, stressing that the country has retained its revolutionary traditions and that these are reflected in its role in international affairs.

The rapid development of the world revolutionary process is characteristic of the present historical period. Imperialism and neocolonialism are being exposed to ever increasing pressure by the national liberation forces and in particular by the young independent states. In many countries the struggle for national liberation has been developing into a struggle against feudal and capitalist relations. The offensive of the forces of national and social liberation against the domination of imperialism comes up against the active resistance of the imperialists. However, imperialism no longer has the strength to turn back the wheel of history. Its possibilities and resources are limited.

The positive shift in the international arena

in the direction of détente creates favorable conditions for the development of the struggle against the remnants of colonialism and neocolonialism and for equitable economic and political relations between all states. The atmosphere of international détente makes it difficult for the imperialists to resort to their favorite "classical" methods of retaining their domination in the Third World. The principle of peaceful coexistence and cooperation is asserting itself in international relations, and thus the imperialist "big stick," although it has not been discarded completely, is becoming anachronistic. One can understand why the imperialist and neocolonialist forces which actively oppose international détente are not averse to resorting to an arbitrary interpretation of history.

For the same reason many American historians and journalists are turning to America's revolutionary heritage, stressing that the United States itself had been a British colony, and that it was the first colony to achieve independence in the Revolution late in the 18th century.

However, a number of authors arbitrarily conclude that there is a direct continuity of the revolutionary heritage in U.S. foreign policy from the War for Independence to the present day. Thus, Professor Richard B. Morris, in his book *The Emerging Nations and the American Revolution*, described as a gross distortion of the truth the assertion that American society subsequently departed from its revolutionary ideals, and took the road of expansion and imperialism. "It is one of ironies of our time," wrote Professor Morris, "that the nation which achieved its independence in the first anti-colo-

nial revolution of the modern world should now be castigated by its critics for assuming the mantle of colonialism so abruptly dropped by other Western powers.”¹ Professor Morris went out of his way to stress that “values derived from the American revolutionary experience are still central to the American way of life and the American purpose as a nation.”² He was especially vociferous in defending the claim that the American War for Independence continues to have a world-wide significance, especially for the emerging nations, as the most suitable “example” and “model” for them. Richard B. Morris declared quite bluntly that “mankind must make up its mind either for the July ’76 Revolution in America or the October ’17 Revolution in Russia.”³ Professor Morris, it is obvious, believes that the emerging nations should follow the American road.

In the period following the Revolution American society however has traversed a complicated and controversial road of development an analysis of which, quite obviously, must form the basis of any judgement on the question of “continuity,” and of any recommendations on one or another “model” or “road” of development. What direction did the foreign policy development of the United States take after the 1776 Revolution? Do the principles of relations between nations, which inspired the Americans to struggle against British domination two

¹ R. Morris. *The Emerging Nations and the American Revolution*, N. Y., 1970, p. 178.

² *Ibid.*, p. XI.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

centuries ago, have anything in common with the subsequent foreign policy doctrines and practice of the United States? Has the U.S. position on the question of colonialism and neo-colonialism always conformed to the democratic ideals of the War for Independence?

This work is devoted precisely to the elucidation of these questions.

I. Democratic Traditions

The II Continental Congress, convened in Philadelphia on July 4, 1776, adopted the Declaration of Independence which proclaimed the turning of the former British colony into the United States of America—the first independent state in the New World. The Declaration solemnly stressed that “all men are created equal” and that they “are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights... among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.” Although these “unalienable rights,” following some strange logic, did not apply to women and Negroes, this was nevertheless a progressive document for its time.

The proclamation of the principle of national sovereignty as the basis of the state system was of historic significance. The insurgent British colonies condemned the tyranny of the British Crown, declaring that whenever the form of government begins to run counter to the democratic rights of the people, “it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government.”¹

¹ *The Encyclopaedia Americana*, 1945 edition, N.Y., Chicago, Vol. 8, p. 562.

Nobody in the United States has ever repealed these dignified words. They are part of the country's official ideological façade which it proudly displays to the rest of the world.

The democratic principles proclaimed by the American Revolution immediately met with wide international response. Progressive people in many countries greeted with enthusiasm the American rebellion against oppression and injustice. Sympathy with those fighting for freedom was combined with a recognition that the ideals of the revolution must be spread throughout the world. Karl Marx called the Declaration of Independence the first declaration of human rights. The establishment of national sovereignty as the highest value and the "right to freedom" as an inalienable right, inspired the people of many countries to rise to struggle against tyranny and the out-dated feudal system. This is what makes the Declaration of Independence an outstanding document of both American and world history.

The 18th century war of liberation against the British had a tremendous influence on the development of the democratic traditions of the American people. Although the American Revolution was bourgeois in content it had a very strong democratic element. Despite the resistance of the big bourgeoisie and the slave-owning planters, the progressive gains of the popular masses found reflection in a number of legislative acts, and became a traditional element of the country's political life.

The democratic traditions of the American people were still evident during the Civil War which took place in the United States in the

19th century. All progressive people in Europe sided with the "Yankees" who were fighting for the liberation of the Negro slaves. The progressive traditions of the American people later found expression in the "Hands off Soviet Russia" movement, which was directed against the anti-Soviet intervention unleashed by the imperialist circles of Britain, France and the United States after the victory of the 1917 October Revolution in Russia. The sympathies of American working people for the peoples of Russia were reflected in the mass petitions of protest, demonstrations of solidarity and in the refusal to load arms for the intervention forces. The continuity of the democratic traditions of the 18th century revolution was again emphasised by the participation of the American people in the joint struggle of the freedom-loving nations against the fascist aggressors in the days of World War II. Throughout the years of the Vietnam war, the democratic forces in the United States resolutely criticised the government's aggressive policy, and its interference in the internal affairs of the Vietnamese people.

Progressive, democratic traditions can clearly be traced throughout American history from the formation of the republic of the United States right up to the present day. It is equally easy to discover in the history of this country the presence of influential forces which, under the guise of serving these traditions, seek to trample them underfoot. There have always existed two Americas: one, which genuinely embodies the "spirit of '76" with its recognition of the right of every nation to independence and its rejection of interference in the internal affairs

of other countries, and another, which, in essence, expresses the interests of the rich who strive to dominate and exploit, both at home and abroad, but cover up these aspirations with lofty words about the "democratic heritage." There has always been conflict between these two Americas and we regret to say that the democratic elements have by no means always gained the upper hand.

The prominent American politician Senator James William Fulbright, who is not indifferent to the image of his country abroad, develops this concept of "two Americas" in the following words: "There are two Americas... one is generous and human, the other narrowly egotistical; one is self-critical, the other self-righteous; one is sensible, the other romantic; one is good-humored, the other solemn; one is inquiring, the other pontificating; one is moderate, the other filled with passionate intensity; one is judicious and the other arrogant in the use of power."¹ "We have," the Senator continued, "tended in the years of our great power to puzzle the world by presenting to it now the one face of America, now the other, and sometimes both at once."²

We have already mentioned the development of the progressive tendency in American history. We would now like to dwell on opposite tendency. We are not talking, it should be noted, about another aspect of the American national character, but about the interests of

¹ J. William Fulbright. *The Arrogance of Power*, N. Y., 1966, p. 254.

² *Ibid.*, p. 245.

definite social groups which strove to monopolise power in the newly-created republic of the United States—the big bourgeoisie and the slave-owning planters.

II. Anti-Democratic Traditions

A commitment to colonial expansion was part of the policy of the young American bourgeoisie back in the days of the struggle for independence. William Appleman Williams, Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin, has pointed out that from the very outset of their national existence the Americans believed that they were building their own empire, and suggests that this idea was an inalienable part of the awakening national self-consciousness which culminated in the American Revolution. On the face of it, this might seem strange, especially if we consider the colonial past of the young republic. In reality, explains Professor Williams, this early predominance of colonial thinking is neither very strange nor very difficult to explain. Having matured in an age of empires as part of an empire, the colonists naturally saw themselves as potential empire-builders once they had joined issue with the mother country.¹

The struggle of the Americans for independence accelerated the decay of the British, Spanish and French empires—the greatest colonial empires at the time. And this, from the histori-

¹ William Appleman Williams. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, N. Y., 1962, p. 19.

cal point of view, was a progressive development. However, one should not forget that the territories occupied by the colonists were inhabited by Indians. Colonisation was inevitably linked with the eviction or extermination of this indigenous population. There was also other important circumstance which affected the future of the republic: having grown accustomed to expanding the borders of the new state through the annexation (usually forcibly) of the neighbouring territories, the American bourgeoisie and slave-owning planters acquired a taste for expansion which developed with the growth of the power of the United States. Thus as soon as the new state had been formed the ruling circles of the young republic began to look around with increasing interest: and wherever they looked, they saw vast and poorly defended territories. Initial expansion was aimed at the "development" of the North American continent. The colonists, who had but recently voiced their indignation at the oppression of the British Crown, began to push their frontiers back.

One of the first attempts at expansionism on the part of the American bourgeoisie was the attempt to annex Canada. As far back as May 1775, i.e. one year before the declaration of independence, American troops occupied Fort Ticonderoga. Soon after a fifteen-thousand-strong force under the command of General Philip Schuyler, a big landowner, advanced into Canadian territory. Encouraged by the fact that they had not encountered any serious resistance, the Americans lay siege to Quebec, the Canadian capital, but were defeated.

This setback did not cool the ardour of the expansionists. During the 1812-14 war against Britain a number of American leaders nurtured plans for expanding the "borders of freedom" to include Canada in the north and East Florida in the south. To justify the necessity of increasing the territory of the United States, the "hawks" of those days readily referred to the "will of Providence." Thus, Robert Harper, member of the House of Representatives, declared that "our Creator" had defined the American border in the south as running along the line of the Gulf of Mexico, and in the north along the line of the zone of eternal frost. In June 1812 the expansionists tabled a bill in the Senate giving the President the right to occupy and hold all or any part of East Florida, as well as the part of West Florida which did not belong to the United States. In addition, the bill provided for the take over of the British provinces in the north.

Objecting to this bill, Congressman Stanford argued that to justify the annexation of foreign lands by referring to the "necessity" of protecting trade was the same as justifying the seizing of your neighbour's field by reference to the "necessity" of protecting your own field. The bill was defeated by an insignificant majority of votes. Nevertheless, in December 1817 American forces captured Amelia Island which had been declared Mexican territory, and in 1818 Spanish East Florida. In February 1819 a treaty was imposed on Spain, which was already weak, under which the United States not only received Florida but also secured the demarcation of the border with the Spanish colo-

nial empire in the west up to the shores of the Pacific Ocean along the 42nd parallel.

The expansionist section of the American ruling class distorted the ideals of the revolution, adapting them to the justification of their policy of aggrandizement. As had been the case in the history of other countries, lofty principles were emasculated and gradually reduced to bombastic slogans which were used to cover up unsavoury deeds. The gap between the ideas which were preached and practical politics began to grow.

The American state and social system which emerged after the War for Independence was, on the whole, more progressive than in Europe (although one should not forget that the democracy of Jefferson and Jackson was of a narrow-minded class character, to say nothing of the fact that it coexisted amiably with slavery).

The apologists of "Americanism" and expansionism used this fact as a basis for their biased and tendentious conclusions about the exclusive nature of the American road of development and the "American way of life."

In time, the thesis that America, due to the specific features of her geography and history, was a country "singled out by God," that the "American way of life" was the highest achievement of civilisation, and that the unique combination of economic might with intellectual and practical genius was enabling America to build a special, "better" world markedly different from the "sinful" society of the Old World took root in official American ideology. It is easy to see the great significance of this tenet for the ideology of expansionism. Since the

American system had been proclaimed the most progressive the widespread dissemination of these principles of living among other nations, which had been denied the benefits of these blessings, was seen as America's moral duty. Thus, a sense of mission and expansionism inevitably followed from the thesis of the universality and superiority of the American system. The U.S. ruling circles invariably dressed up their expansionist policy in the chaste robes of a "civilising mission," the defence of freedom, and various kinds of aid, while the historical concept adopted by the American élite was based on the firm belief that the American system would triumph throughout the world under cover of these "ideals." The existence of a strong religious tradition gave the American sense of mission the character of a faith, while American foreign policy acquired the features of doctrinairism and ideological intolerance reminiscent of the crusades.

Richard B. Morris explained this missionary expansionism as resulting from the initial impulse of the American Revolution which "was pitched on a moral and even evangelical plane." "Stripped of its sense of mission," continued Professor Morris, "American intervention in world affairs in the twentieth century would have assumed the character of a naked power grab."¹ There is no denying the truth of this statement. But what have the ideas of the revolution got to do with this? The exaggerated sense of mission of American expansionism is largely explained by the fact that the American

¹ R. Morris. *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

Revolution, in contrast to the British (17th century) and French (18th century) revolutions, did not terminate in an officially proclaimed restoration. The country's ruling circles had thus to pay at least symbolic tribute to the revolutionary heritage, presenting themselves as the irreproachable custodians of this heritage.

The claim that U.S. expansion in one way or another extends the sphere of freedom appeared as far back as the end of the 18th century. The 19th century saw the appearance of the theory of "Manifest Destiny" which claimed that Providence itself had destined the United States to take the leading role in the world. America's pretensions had received, as it were, divine approval. This was undoubtedly an extremely convenient, even though unconvincing, method which made it possible to explain practically any foreign policy moves by referring to the will of God.

In November 1819 Secretary of State John Q. Adams described as unnatural that "fragments of territory with sovereigns... hundred miles beyond the sea" bordered on the United States. He had in mind the colonial possessions of the European powers, above all of Britain. The American statesman declared that "the world shall be familiarised with the idea of considering our proper dominion to be the continent of North America."¹ As if the fact that the "sovereign" was right there and not hundreds of miles away made any difference to the subordinate nature of these territories. John

¹ A. Weinberg. *Manifest Destiny*, Baltimore, 1935, p. 61.

Adams spoke only of North America. Other Americans gave the issue a much broader interpretation. Thus, on May 10, 1820, Congressman Henry Clay called on his countrymen to expand the "American system" to include South America.

The so-called Monroe Doctrine, renouncing European interference in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere, marked a new stage in the development of American expansionism. This Doctrine was formulated by President James Monroe in his Message to Congress on December 2, 1823.

The Monroe Doctrine reflected the ambiguity of the U.S. position on the national liberation movement at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries. On the one hand, the United States, a state which had come into being as a result of an anti-colonial revolution, felt that it was necessary to criticise "alien" colonialism in the Western Hemisphere (if only in self-defense). On the other hand, influential sections of the American ruling class were not averse to picking up the fragments of the crumbling colonial empires. The democratic wording of the Doctrine was designed to expose the reactionary principles of the Holy Alliance of European monarchs, and, in particular, the idea of European intervention aimed at suppressing the national liberation movement of the American peoples. In other words, in advancing the Monroe Doctrine the United States seemed to be protecting and defending the other American states. However, the smooth phraseology and impressive wording did not change the essence of the matter. When the great European

powers were ousted from the American continent, the United States became the economically most powerful country in the Western Hemisphere. This uneven correlation of forces made it easy for the United States to combine the promised "patronage" with the pretension to domination. By blocking the road to a European intervention, the United States paved the way for its own intervention. The U.S. expansionists gradually began to replace the thesis "America for the Americans" by a more concretised formula: "America for the North Americans." In 1846 the southern planters provoked a war against Mexico. And a year later the advancing American forces took the Mexican capital. On February 2, 1848, a peace treaty was signed in Guadalupe Hidalgo. Mexico thereby lost California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas, i.e. more than half of its territory. A number of Congressmen, representing the southern states, called for the complete annexation of Mexico.

Progressive sections of the American people protested against this anti-Mexican action. Among them was the outstanding American statesman Abraham Lincoln, at the time a member of the House of Representatives. Answering the accusation that the war contributed to the spreading of slavery, the expansionists coolly declared that slavery was permitted both by the Constitution and the Bible.

During the middle of the 19th century the United States attempted to strengthen its position in the Isthmus of Panama. After a period of extreme rivalry between Britain and the U.S.A. in this area, the two countries conclu-

ded an agreement in 1850 on the neutralisation of the isthmus zone and on joint ownership of the future canal.

In the 19th century the United States asserted itself as the predominant power in the Western Hemisphere. It would be wrong to regard America's expansionist drive against its neighbours as the expression of any specific aggressive traits of the American national character. The dominating role of the United States was determined by a number of important factors and, primarily, by the rapid development of capitalism in that country. The U.S.A. occupied an extremely favorable geographical position, and had at its disposal vast reserves of mineral wealth. Furthermore, mass immigration from Europe created the necessary reserves of skilled manpower. The rapid industrial development of the United States boosted the country's economic potential considerably: between 1820 and 1860 the U.S. share in world industrial production increased from 6 to 15 per cent. In other words, by 1860 the United States was the fourth industrial power in the world (after Britain, France and Germany). This "industrial miracle" called for foreign markets. At the same time it created a sufficient material base for expansion. One should not forget the role of the "imperial ambitions" of the American bourgeoisie in encouraging a foreign policy of expansion. It would be well to remember that expansionist ideology was a derivative of the economy, and not vice versa.

In its drive into Central and South America the United States did not always resort to force. The economic superiority of the U.S.A. and

the relative weakness of the other countries of the continent made coercion, on the whole, unnecessary. Economic methods, or, to be more exact, "dollar diplomacy," have had (and continue to have) the advantage that they give American colonial expansion a semblance of a peaceful and even democratic development. Even so, in the second half of the 19th century the United States perpetrated some 50 acts of aggression against the countries of Latin America.

The economic expansion of the United States was not limited to the Western Hemisphere. In the Far East U.S. naval forces fostered America's trading interests in the area. In 1853 an American naval squadron under the flag of Commander Matthew C. Perry, landed on the shores of Japan, and the visit was instrumental in the signing of the American-Japanese treaty of "peace and friendship." This gunboat diplomacy led to the "discovery" of Japan for American trade. Commander Perry's naval squadron also took part in suppressing the Tai Ping peasant rebellion in China, and in the abortive attempt to turn the Ryukyu Islands into an American protectorate. While proclaiming the continuity of their democratic traditions, the U.S. ruling circles gradually began to revise them.

III. Revision of Democratic Heritage

In following the stages of the development of the ideology and practice of American expan-

sionism one cannot help noting the new elements which appeared with the epoch of imperialism. Even Professor Morris, who prefers to stress the trends which show America's loyalty to her democratic traditions rather than the unseemly activities which trample these traditions under foot, is forced to make the following admission: "Suddenly, in 1898, America found herself a colonial power. Imperialists, convinced of the importance of naval power and fortified by spurious social Darwinism, justified Anglo-Saxon domination over 'under-developed' nations."¹ Morris justly points to this important feature of American expansionism in the epoch of imperialism—the striving to build a world empire.

On the threshold of the 20th century the United States began on a course of global expansion, taking active part in the imperialist struggle for colonies, sources of raw materials and spheres of investment. The foreign policy of the United States was a reflection of the internal process of the formation of monopoly capitalism which was taking place during the last three decades of the 19th century. For America this was a period of especially rapid economic development. Between 1870 and 1900 the production of pig iron in the country increased eight-fold, the corresponding figures for steel and coal being 150-fold and eight-fold respectively. The United States became the greatest industrial power in the world. The upsurge of industrial production was accompanied by the concentration and centralisation of

¹ R. Morris. *Op. cit.*, p. 158.

capital. Lenin stressed that: "The American trusts are the supreme expression of the economics of imperialism or monopoly capitalism."¹ At the same time this "big leap" showed the disparity between the economic potential of America and her political influence.

The economic motives behind foreign expansion which operated in the epoch of free capitalism, began to find ever increasing expression with the transition to imperialism. Many of the old motives were supplemented by new motives: the struggle for sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, for spheres of influence, and economic "space" in general. America was too late to participate in the carving up of the world, and her economic and political development was such that she evolved her own specific methods of expansion, resorting primarily to economic penetration as a form of colonial policy. This is the main difference between American colonial policy and the classical British and French colonialism of the late 19th century. (Needless to say the United States was not averse to using military methods of expansion as well whenever it was convenient.)

The epoch of imperialism saw a change in the scope and scale of pretensions of U.S. expansionism. As we have already noted, in the pre-imperialist epoch these pretensions were restricted mainly to the Western Hemisphere, i.e. were of a regional nature. With the transition to imperialism the ideology and practice of expansionism began to show clearly expressed

¹ V. Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 23, p. 44.

global intentions. In a speech in 1867 Secretary of State William Henry Seward, bridged the gap between the two epochs when he declared that the United States was called upon to take possession of the American continent and establish control over the whole world. Of course, in the 1860's such statements were, in a certain sense, of an abstract nature. However, by the 1890's an organisation with the prosaic name of National Association of Manufacturers began to convene its congresses. The members of this association—sober businessmen—discussed the same themes as William Seward, only on a more practical level. The businessmen did not build castles in the air; they put forward concrete plans aimed at ousting their European rivals in the field of foreign trade.

The most interesting aspect of these business-like discussions was the geography of the contemplated economic activities. As in the past, a lion's share of attention was devoted to the United States' Latin American neighbours. However, considerable prominence was now also given to the possibilities of the Far Eastern countries as markets for American goods and spheres of capital investment. Special significance was attached to the vast Chinese market. The gentlemen spoke of transactions in remote and exotic lands in such a matter-of-fact way as if they were discussing business deals in Georgia or Alabama. The global ideology was being realised in a programme of action.

The new economic and political realities, created by the epoch of imperialism, steadily eroded the concept of the exclusive nature of American democracy and its superiority over

European democracy. The popular masses in America continued to remain loyal to their democratic traditions. However, for the ruling élite, intoxicated by the country's might, the ideas and principles of the American War for Independence became an empty abstraction, a convenient line of political rhetoric and social demagoguery.

The epoch of imperialism witnesses the complete revision of the democratic heritage of the late 18th century. The initially democratic foreign policy of the period of the birth of the republic gradually became an apologist ideology adapted as a justification and substantiation of the imperialist policy of expansion.

The marked changes in the ideological climate found expression in the evolution of a number of old doctrines, and in particular of "Manifest Destiny." During the War for Independence the doctrine of a "chosen nation" was widely used against the British colonialists. However, subsequently it gradually acquired expansionist overtones as the moral basis for the "civilising mission" of the United States. In the previous chapter we have already seen what this mission often meant in practice. However, the official propaganda line in the post-revolutionary period was dominated by the thesis that America must contribute to the spreading of her form of government not by force or cunning but by serving as an example and demonstrating her achievements. As far back as the 1830's, this idea was expressed by President Jackson who emphasised the "special duty" of the United States to serve as an "example" and "represent civilisation." The prominent American politici-

an Albert Gallatin pointed out that the mission of the United States was to improve the world and be a "model republic."

The end of the century saw the dove turning into a hawk. In the 1880's and the 1890's U.S. bourgeois ideology openly preaches expansionism, substantiating it with reference to the theory of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority and so-called social Darwinism (the struggle for existence was held to be the basis of international relations).

The advocates of this policy claimed that the advantages of the American offshoot of the Anglo-Saxon race, both in political organisation and economic power, would ultimately lead to the world-wide domination of American civilisation, and the creation of a United States stretching from pole to pole. The racism of these theoreticians becomes especially manifest in their approach to the problem of relations between the so-called advanced and backward nations. These ideologists held that Anglo-Saxon political ideals should only be spread among the "civilised" nations. In dealing with the "backward" (meaning the colonial peoples), any methods and means were permissible. Thus, wars could be justifiably waged by the "advanced races" against "barbarism" and were the advisable means by which the Anglo-Saxons should develop the "backward continents." These theorists dreamed of the day, which in their fantasy was not far off, when four-fifths of the human race would trace their origin to English ancestors. Having gained a strong foothold and settled down in both hemispheres, this race would retain the naval and trade superiority

which it had first achieved when the first English settlers landed in the New World.

The tremendous disparity between these and similar claims, on the one hand, and the statement of the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal" is obvious. One of the most prominent expounders of the "Manifest Destiny" doctrine in the new historical period was the Protestant missionary Josiah Strong. As a missionary, he interpreted this doctrine, on the whole, from the theological point of view. Confidently taking upon himself the role of an expounder of the Will of God, Josiah Strong claimed that the "star" of Christianity had risen over the American West, and that there it would remain forever. However, such was the spirit of the times that even a Christian preacher had to link the will of Providence with the interests of business. Josiah Strong supplemented his divine determinism with economic determinism, stressing the important role of industry in developing the "Manifest Destiny" of the Anglo-Saxons. In glaring contradiction to the Christian teaching, this missionary emphasised the superiority of the Anglo-Saxons and called on them to prepare for the final "struggle" between the races. Josiah Strong declared that it was the manifest destiny of the Anglo-Saxons to oust some races and assimilate others, so that ultimately all mankind would be Anglo-Saxonised.¹

The latter statement shows the presence of a new element in the racist concepts of the late

¹ J. Strong. *Our Country*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1863, pp. 40, 200-201, 216-217.

19th-century expansionists, namely, so-called social Darwinism. In their striving to lend scientific conviction to the idea of superior and inferior races, Josiah Strong and other theoreticians of his ilk turned to the teachings of Darwin and attempted to apply his principles of the struggle for existence in the animal world to the sphere of social relations and relations between the nations. This led to the birth of the legend about the struggle of the races for existence, the survival of the fittest, etc. This social-Darwinist legend becomes the keynote and refrain of Josiah Strong's triumphal hymn to glorify the Anglo-Saxon nation. With chilling equanimity Strong claimed as self-evident that the "inferior" serve the "superior," that the soil gives life to the grass, the grass to the animals, the animals to man, and that, consequently, it was natural (!) that the aborigines of North America, Australia and New Zealand would become extinct under the onslaught of the all-conquering Anglo-Saxons.

It is interesting to note that among the outstanding qualities of the Anglo-Saxon race Josiah Strong singled out the instinct or genius for colonisation. In actual fact, this was the essence of his whole programme which was typical of expansionism of the time. Strong wrote that the rich and numerically most powerful Anglo-Saxons, possessed of a unique energy and having developed the aggressive features necessary for the spreading of their institutions, would expand throughout the whole world, bringing Mexico, Central and South America, Africa, etc. into the orbit of their influence. Strong spoke with unconcealed contempt of the old principle

of national sovereignty, claiming that this principle had originated in the past under the influence of "primitive theories." Today, he alleged, scientific discoveries pointed to the existence of underdeveloped races incapable of self-government.¹ It is by no means a coincidence that the idea of the "manifest destiny" of the Anglo-Saxons became the breeding ground of the most rabid chauvinism and expansionism in American history.

Revising the political dictionary of the 18th century, the expansionists of the epoch of imperialism introduced notions and terms which in their view better reflected the spirit of the times. The concrete content of these notions corresponded fully to the requirements of the imperialist expansion which had already begun. Among such new ideas we can name the "frontier" theory advanced by the prominent American historian Frederick Turner. Previously the leaders of the American Revolution (for example, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson) regarded the idea of the existence of a free land as the fundamental factor in the creation of the democratic farmers' republic. Turner on the other hand believed that the colonisation of the free lands and the pushing of the frontier to the west was the motive force in American history. Frederick Turner's theory also had a bearing on foreign policy for he proclaimed that all the free land had been taken and the formation of the borders completed by 1890. Since then the "frontier" theory has become the most popular argument in favor of expansion.

¹ J. Strong. *Op. cit.*, pp. 202, 212, 214.

Since according to this theory, territorial expansion was the determining factor of the development of the U.S.A., the existence and development of the American institutions became inseparably linked with expansion. However, by the end of the 19th century the free land to the West had been colonised, and, consequently, there was no longer a "frontier."

Hence, it followed, that a new frontier had to be sought outside the limits of the United States. The political conclusion to be drawn from Turner's theory was the urgent necessity of foreign expansion for the United States. That is why Turner called for the implementation of an energetic foreign policy, the building up of the country's naval power, and the stepping up of American influence abroad. He also suggested the concrete direction American expansion should take: the Pacific Ocean area and the Far East.¹

The growth of imperialist tendencies in the U.S.A. was accompanied by the promotion of the cult of force. This found expression, for example, in the idea of naval might based on the thesis that the United States would inevitably have to wage a struggle against the other great powers for world domination. Alfred Mahan, the author of this concept, energetically upheld the necessity for the United States to engage in permanent expansion, describing this as the "manifest destiny" of the Americans. He stressed the strategic importance of seizing strongpoints on the major nautical crossroads: the Hawaiian Islands, the Panama Isthmus, etc.

¹ F. Turner. *The Frontier in American History*, N. Y., 1921.

The ideas developed by the theoreticians of expansionism were taken up by influential representatives of the ruling class who were determining American foreign policy at the turn of the 20th century. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, for example, rejected the old interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine which limited U.S. activities to the Western Hemisphere. Acting in full accord with the concepts of the theoreticians of expansionism, he urged the implementation of an extensive programme of overseas acquisition. Albert Beveridge, another influential senator, declared that God had given the Americans experience in leadership in order to guide the "barbarous" and "helpless" nations, and that the American people would ultimately bring about a world revival. Rejecting the main thesis of the Declaration of Independence which proclaimed "government by consent of the governed," Senator Beveridge cynically declared that this thesis was applicable only to those peoples who were capable of self-government. Alleging that world trade must and would be controlled by the United States, Alfred Beveridge emphasised that trading stations overseas would become the centres of large colonies belonging to America.

Theodore Roosevelt, a prominent American politician and President of the United States at the beginning of the 20th century, went even further. He divided the nations into superior and inferior, and regarded the subordination of the latter extremely expedient. According to Theodore Roosevelt, expansion was proof of the genuine greatness of a nation, and simultaneously benefited the subjugated nations since it allegedly contributed to the progress of civilisation.

Theodore Roosevelt thus claimed that India and Egypt had gained from British colonial domination. He welcomed with enthusiasm Alfred Mahan's recommendations on the creation of a powerful American navy, and supported the programme of extensive economic and territorial expansion.

The overseas economic activities of the capitalist corporations, and the foreign policy of the government, followed in the wake of the general course of expansionism. Continuing this policy, American capital infiltrated the Latin American countries, ousting its British rivals from this area. The activities of the North American businessmen enjoyed the full support of U.S. diplomacy. In 1895 the United States intervened in the border conflict between Venezuela and British Guiana, and, under the pretext of protecting the Latin American countries against British pretensions, proclaimed itself the sole master of the continent. This was explicitly declared by Secretary of State Richard Olney in his famous note to Great Britain in which he stressed that the will of the U.S.A. was law in countries under its "protection." It is interesting to note the reasoning used by the Secretary of State in support of the U.S. claims to undivided domination over both parts of America. Referring to the "unlimited resources" of the United States and its "invulnerability," Richard Olney pronounced this to be sufficient grounds for Washington to do as it pleases in the Western Hemisphere.

The stand of the U.S. government suited the expansionist circles. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge declared that the U.S.A. must "lead" the

Western Hemisphere. Theodore Roosevelt, expecting a war with Britain, gave serious thought to the conquest of Canada. Latin America, therefore, was not the only continent used to test the new policy of the U.S. ruling circles in the epoch of imperialism.

The founders of the United States had warned the young nation of the undesirability of getting involved in conflicts with the Old World. As far back as 1813, Thomas Jefferson had emphasised that the European countries constituted a separate area of the world with its own interests, and that the United States should not meddle in its affairs. However, by the end of the century the Western Hemisphere became too narrow for the imperialist circles of North America. Driven by their desire for profit rather than by their "manifest destiny," American businessmen had long been engaged in gaining a foothold and fortifying their positions in distant land, often acting at their own risk.

Since the days of Commander Perry's expedition trade expansion had increasingly begun to be backed by force of arms. Expansionism often had the character of plain piracy, with the representatives of the "superior" civilisation acting like ordinary highwaymen or "gentlemen of fortune." Thus, back in 1866 the armed American schooner "General Sherman" had landed a raiding party in Korea with the aim of plundering the ancient tombs in the vicinity of Pyongyang. A year later another "expedition," led by Thornton Alexander Jenkins, again raided the country. In 1871 a naval squadron with Frederick Rodgers in command sailed to the Korean shores in order to impose a

fettering treaty on the country. In 1880 the U.S. navy again appeared in Korean territorial waters. And in 1882, by means of promises and open pressure, the Americans at last forced Korea to sign a number of inequitable agreements.

The United States was relatively late in taking the road of colonialism, and this aggravated its relations with the powers which had forestalled it and achieved considerable successes in this field. Thus, at the end of the 19th century the Hawaiian and Samoa Islands in the Pacific became a bone of contention. In 1878 the Americans had concluded a treaty with the Samoa Islands, under which the U. S. A. received extraterritorial rights, as well as the right to set up a naval base on the islands. However, the British and German expansionists had also laid claim to domination in the Samoas. After an acute struggle between the claimants, in which the local population was involved, a three-power condominium over the islands was established in 1889. Ten years later Samoa was divided between the United States and Germany. A conflict of interests also occurred over the Hawaiian Islands. This time America's rivals were France and Britain. Its strong economic position eventually enabled the United States, by bringing in their armed forces, to annex Hawaii in 1898.

The most intense struggle between the colonial powers developed in the Far East, with China as the prize. American commercial and industrial circles which had links with the Chinese market created a special committee in China and then set up the American Asiatic

Association. With the help of these organisations they exerted continuous pressure on the government in Washington, urging it to step up America's participation in the struggle for China. Charles Denby, a former American diplomat who became an honorary member of the American Asiatic Association, claimed that the Pacific Ocean was even more important for the United States than the Atlantic. Thus, the imperialist aspirations of the American monopoly circles, which strove for a redivision of the world in conformity with the growing might of the United States, found ever increasing expression in the U.S. foreign policy both towards China and in other spheres of colonial activity. These aspirations led to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898—the first imperialist war for the redivision of the already divided world. This war marked the beginning of a new stage in the development of capitalism—imperialism.

The uprising of the Cuban people against Spanish domination served as a pretext for the Spanish-American War and for the official legend about the liberating mission of the Americans in this war. It goes without saying that democratic circles in the United States expressed sympathy with the national liberation movement of the Cubans. In 1895 a number of American trade unions passed resolutions in support of the just struggle of the Cuban people. However, for the expansionist-orientated monopolists and politicians the sympathy of the American public with the Cuban independence struggle was an ideal pretext for the implementation of their far-reaching aims. The colonia-

list aspirations of American big business could be camouflaged by humane motives, and the imperialist war itself identified with the old American tradition of "defending the cause of freedom." As in the days of the American War for Independence, the conflict with Spain was a war against a colonial empire. However, in this case it was not a struggle against colonialism, but a struggle to become a colonial empire.

Historical material dating back to those days contains numerous expressions of sympathy (both formal and sincere) for the Cubans who had risen against the Spanish oppressors. The press carried numerous appeals for support to be rendered the "suffering island." Such sentiments on the part of the democratic circles of America are quite understandable. However, those who advocated the establishment of the domination of "white race" over the "savages" also expressed ardent sympathy for the sufficiently "multi-colored" Cubans. The American press gave a wide and vivid coverage to the plight of the freedom-loving islanders, but also carried modest and inconspicuous articles about the rich deposits of various ores on Cuba that could be developed if the island became part of the United States. In July 1891 General Thomas Jordan explained to the readers of *Forum* magazine why the United States "needed" Cuba. Speaking with a straightforwardness and bluntness typical of military men, he declared that the annexation of the island would constitute a formidable supplement to the American industrial, agricultural, commercial and military system.

A survey "Ought We to Annex Cuba?", published in the *American Magazine of Civics* in 1895, gives us some idea of the programme of the expansionists. "It makes the water come to my mouth when I think of the State of Cuba as one in our family," wrote Frederick R. Coudert, a leading Wall Street figure. And another spokesman for Wall Street stressed that Canada and Mexico would come in time, *but we want Cuba now*. In actual fact, despite all the hue and cry about Spanish domination, the efficient American businessmen were already operating on the island. In 1896 the trade turnover between Cuba and America reached 100 million dollars, while American investments comprised 50 million dollars. So it was not so much a question of Cuba's freedom or even "free trade," as of a sphere of influence and territorial expansion.

The course of the Spanish-American War vividly demonstrated this. Even before the official declaration of war, when the government of President McKinley, which was under constant pressure from the expansionist-backed chauvinistic press, was still marking time, Theodore Roosevelt, who was then the U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Navy, sent a cable (on his own initiative) to the commander of the American naval squadron in the Far East Admiral George Dewey bluntly pointing to the necessity of offensive operations in the area of the Philippines in the event of war.

The victory over Spain turned the U.S.A. into a major colonial power. Under the 1898 Paris Peace Treaty Spain gave up all her claims and rights to Cuba, ceded to the United States the

island of Porto Rico (Puerto Rico since 1932) and other Spanish islands in the West Indies, the Island of Guam in the Pacific, as well as the Philippine Archipelago (the terms included the payment of 20 million dollars to Spain as compensation). The contradictions between the "freedom-loving" rhetoric with which America entered the war, and its results gave rise to a wave of indignation. The forces inside the country opposed to the policy of imperialist expansion justly pointed out that the annexation of the Spanish colonies trampled under foot the underlying principle of the American War for Independence: government by consent of the governed. By its colonialist policy of expansion the U.S. government once again made a mockery of the American democratic tradition. The Boston lawyer Moorfield Storey, a leading figure of the anti-imperialist opposition, justly noted that in opening a fresh chapter in the country's history by means of colonial acquisitions, the expansionists were setting out along a dangerous road, and that an abandonment of George Washington's policy of non-interference in the affairs of the Old World would mean the permanent threat of military complications thousands of miles from the United States.

In 1899 the opposition set up the American Anti-Imperialist League which undertook to defend the American democratic tradition. The League justly pointed out that the acquisition of colonies ran counter to the Constitution of the United States. Opposing the annexionist peace treaty, Senator Bell, an opposition spokesman, also resorted to a number of historical arguments. He reminded the expansionists that

the revolutionary war which had led to the formation of the American Republic, was a war against the European colonial system, and that a free country cannot be a colonial power. It was from this view-point that Senator Bell approached the national liberation movement which had unfolded in the Philippines and Cuba. The Senator regarded the American occupation of Cuba and the annexation of the Philippines as unjust.

The anti-colonialists laid special emphasis on the connection between the policy of colonial expansion and the domestic situation in the United States. At a mass meeting in Chicago on April 30, 1899 one of the speakers pointed out that when such words as "colony," "invasion," and "conquest" were included into a country's political vocabulary, they made null and void the notions of "democracy" and "republic." Another champion of anti-colonialism noted that "present-day imperialism" could in the future develop into militarism, and then Caesarism. The resolution adopted by the meeting stressed that the policy of imperialism was hostile to freedom and trampled under foot the democratic tradition. The resolution also expressed regret that in the land of Washington and Lincoln one was forced to prove that all people, irrespective of the color of their skin, had the right to "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." The founding convention the Anti-Imperialist League, held in Chicago in November 1899, repeated word for word the provisions of the Declaration of Independence about national sovereignty and "unalienable Rights." The League condemned the policy of the government in

the Spanish-American War as a criminal aggression, and stressed that the colonialist course was an attempt to destroy the fundamental principles and lofty ideals of the American people. It is interesting to note that one of the pamphlets distributed by the supporters of the Anti-Imperialist League pointed out that in their struggle for freedom and independence the people of the Philippines were inspired by the 1776 American War for Independence.

Carl Schurz, an opponent of the imperialist policy, wrote that every time plans were being made to annex some foreign territory, the American expansionists, to silence the opposition, began to invoke the "manifest destiny" of the United States whereas, in actual fact, these plans served the interests of a small but influential circle of businessmen, nationalists and top-ranking officers. Carl Schurz was thus the first to point to the formation of an alliance of forces which subsequently would become known as the "military-industrial complex." Another anti-imperialist Richard Pettigrew was even more to the point. Why, he asked, did the United States have such an irresistible desire to acquire the Philippines, Haiti, and Costa Rica? Because, he answered, American imperialist policy was determined by the striving of the plutocracy for profits, markets, and spheres of investment. This connection between the policy of expansion and the interests of the powerful financial oligarchy was noted by many publicists in the anti-expansionist camp. It should be noted that despite the chauvinistic passions fanned by imperialist propaganda, the overwhelming majority of American workers

condemned the policy of war and annexation. The logic of the arguments put forward by the anti-imperialists could not be denied, but they were in the minority. Even though the vote was marginal the expansionists succeeded in pushing the approval of the Paris Peace Treaty through the Senate.

The 1898 Spanish-American War ended in complete victory for the U.S.A. The United States was becoming a "world power," and emerging onto the arena of global politics. America's domination of the Western Hemisphere seemed unquestionable. However, there was an even more tempting prospects ahead. The power which dominates the Pacific Ocean dominates the whole world, explained Senator Albert Beveridge in a speech devoted to the termination of the Spanish-American War. And, he added, with the annexation of the Philippines the American Republic had become such a power and would continue indefinitely to remain in this capacity.

The colonialist policy of the U.S. ruling circles even then came up against the strong resistance of the population of the countries which had fallen victim to American expansion. Both Cuba and the Philippines had a powerful national liberation movement which had made a considerable contribution to the liberation of these countries from Spanish domination, and which refused to tolerate the presence of the new colonialists. It is interesting to note that the anti-Spanish liberation forces in the Philippines had proclaimed their own Declaration of Independence on June 12, 1898 and that the country already had its own national

government before the arrival of the American occupation forces. The U.S. government ignored this clearly expressed will of the Philippine people. President McKinley declared that the U.S.A. could not leave the Philippine people to themselves since the islanders were not ready for self-government.

The American government resorted to ruthless reprisals to break the resistance of the national movement of the Philippine people. The command of the American occupation forces in the archipelago declared the liberation struggle of the people illegal, thereby sanctioning the most inhuman methods of dealing with the guerrillas. Branding the Philippine people as a "lower race," the American armed forces waged a campaign against the native population reminiscent of the notorious extermination campaigns against the American Indians. The captured guerrillas, and any persons suspected of supporting them, were subjected to torture, and the "guerrilla" villages were razed to the ground. In the Philippines the Americans used the so-called concentration method, borrowed from the Spanish colonialists: the peasants were forcibly resettled and surrounded by troops in order to isolate them from the guerrillas. A total of 126 thousand American troops participated in the suppression of the liberation movement in the Philippines. And still, despite the fact that on July 4, 1902 (Independence Day!), President Theodore Roosevelt declared an end to the Philippine-American War, the punitive operations in the islands continued right through to 1913.

Nevertheless, the clashes with the national

liberation movement, and the opposition of the anti-expansionist forces at home, compelled American imperialism to manoeuvre. The desire to present America's colonial policy as a short cut to the achievement of independence for the occupied countries found vivid expression in the official propaganda over the Philippines problem. Thus, President McKinley claimed quite seriously that the aim of the United States was to educate and civilise the Philippine people. Woodrow Wilson, the future President of the United States, wrote in December 1902 that the Americans must teach the Philippine people to respect law and order before granting them independence. The "educational" methods of the United States have been described above.

The anti-colonialist smokescreen was also used elsewhere. When American troops landed in Puerto Rico in 1898, their commanding officer—General Nelson A. Miles—told the islanders that the Americans had come "to bring protection," "to promote prosperity" and to bestow "the blessings of the liberal institutions of our government." In actual fact, the U. S. Congress passed a law in 1900 establishing an administration complete with governor in a manner reminiscent of British colonial rule. And instead of the promised prosperity, to quote Professor R. Morris, "it (Puerto Rico) seemed rooted in the poverty and filth which had been its lot for generations."¹

The attempt to camouflage America's expansionist policy with an anti-colonialist front was also vividly reflected in the so-called Open Door Policy proclaimed by Secretary of State John

¹ R. Morris. *Op. cit.*, p. 162.

Hay in 1899. We have already mentioned that America's attempts to gain a firm foothold in China came up against the resistance of the other imperialist powers who had already divided that country into spheres of influence. This prompted the United States to advance the thesis of "equal rights and opportunities" for all powers in China. According to Williams, author of *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, the policy of the open door was designed to establish the conditions under which "America's preponderant economic power would extend the American system throughout the world without the embarrassment and inefficiency of traditional colonialism."¹ In his view, the Open Door Policy operated splendidly for half a century and enabled the United States to set up a new and influential empire; it was in fact "a brilliant strategic stroke which led to the gradual extension of American economic and political power throughout the world."²

The Open Door Policy was supplemented by "dollar diplomacy"—in 1912 President William Howard Taft had stressed that the policy of his government was to clear the way not with rifles but with dollars. The U.S. government, President Taft continued, would do everything in its power to support profitable American enterprises overseas. However, dollar diplomacy in no way excluded the "tough line" in the expansionist policy of the United States. Professor Richard Morris admitted that whenever uprisings

¹ W. Williams. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, N. Y., 1962, p. 43.

² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

or internal unrest threatened American interests, the policy of Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson was to dispatch marines to ensure order and forestall revolutions.

The early 20th century saw the imperialist interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine fully asserting itself in U.S. policy. In a number of official statements made in 1901-05 President Theodore Roosevelt promoted the idea that within the framework of the Western Hemisphere America's adherence to the Monroe Doctrine might force it to assume the role of an international police force, and that the United States intended to maintain order in this area unilaterally. This new interpretation, which threatened the recalcitrant Latin American countries with intervention, was aptly defined as the "big stick" policy. The other countries of the Western Hemisphere felt quite perceptibly the presence of the symbolic "big stick" of their mighty northern neighbour.

U.S. policy towards Colombia was typical. The Americans were anxious to gain a firm foothold on the Panama Isthmus and by means of diplomatic and military pressure were attempting to secure special rights and privileges for themselves in this important strategic area. In January 1903, after lengthy negotiations, the Colombian government agreed to sign a treaty which placed the zone of the future canal at the full disposal of the United States. However, when the Colombian Senate refused to ratify this shackling treaty, the Wall Street bosses organised a "revolutionary coup" on the Isthmus of Panama. The government of the Panama Republic, set up as a result of the coup, granted

the United States rights to the canal zone for 90 years, as well as the rights to intervene to maintain public order, and to further other aims. All this was set down in the Panama Constitution.

Other Latin American countries—Argentina, Chile, Brazil—were also victims of American intervention.

Having enmeshed Cuba in a web of political commitments, the American monopolies ultimately took over all the key positions in the island's economy: they received the most profitable concessions for the development of useful minerals, the construction of railroads, and the laying out of plantations. The United States imported mainly sugar from Cuba and this fact contributed to the turning of the island into a single-crop country. When the popular uprising in Cuba in 1906 overthrew the pro-American Palma regime, thereby posing a threat to the interests of the U.S. monopolies, Washington immediately exercised its "right of way" and landed American troops in Cuba.

The Haiti Republic was also the victim of constant economic, political and military intervention on the part of its mighty northern neighbour. In the summer of 1914, after Haiti's refusal to allow the United States to enforce control over the islands' custom-offices, a detachment of American marines landed in Port-au-Prince and seized the country's gold reserves. A year later the incursion was repeated. The Americans used force to ensure the "election" of a pro-American president, and imposed a treaty establishing U.S. control over the country's economic and political life. In 1914 the Ameri-

cans landed their troops in the Mexican port of Vera Cruz, thereby intervening in the internal political affairs of Mexico.

Expansionist ideology was thus carried out through the practical politics of intervention.

The success of the U.S. expansionist policy at the turn of the 20th century helped to complete the revision of the democratic heritage of the War for Independence, and facilitated the emergence of a fundamentally new doctrine which proclaimed the 20th century to be the "American Century."

IV. The Shaping of the Imperial Tradition

In 1916, even before the United States entered World War I, President Woodrow Wilson, noting the vast opportunities for economic development, stressed that the U.S.A. would have to finance the world, and therefore needed to understand the world and provide it with guidance. The confident tone of the President reflected the realities of the situation. America's participation in the war was largely that of an arms supplier. The military orders placed by the allies, gave the U.S. vast reserves of gold and currency and promoted considerable industrial growth. In 1917 the gross volume of U.S. industrial production increased by 120 per cent as against the 1914 figure. In 1920 the United States, which accounted for a mere 6 per cent of the world's population, manufactured 85 per

cent of the world output of automobiles, 66 per cent of the world oil, 60 per cent of the copper, 52 per cent of the coal, and 40 per cent of the iron and steel. In 1920 the national wealth of the United States increased by 150 per cent as against the 1914 figure (from 192,000 million dollars to 489,000 million dollars). According to the American historian William Williams, President Wilson believed that the United States must take over the international role which Britain had played in the 19th century.

However, the United States entered the next stage of its imperial grandeur in the period which was the beginning of the end of the colonial empires. The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia dealt world imperialism a mighty blow. Capitalism was no longer the single all-embracing system. Socialism had emerged in the world arena. This gave an impetus to the development of the revolutionary movement in the capitalist countries, and intensified the national liberation movement in the colonial and dependent nations. It goes without saying that the imperialist reaction, to quote Winston Churchill, spared no efforts to strangle the Bolshevik infant at its birth.¹ William Williams has described U.S. policy in this period in the following way:

“(1) as long as the Bolsheviks remain in power the United States would refuse to establish normal intercourse and would under no circumstances recognise Lenin’s government; (2) Washington would do all in its power to aid any serious and conservative leader or group whose aim was

¹ V. Lenin. *A Biography*, p. 338.

the destruction of the Soviet government.”¹ The practical activities of the U.S. ruling circles are well-known: an anti-Soviet intervention, economic blockade, and a policy of “non-recognition” which continued till 1933.

Looking back on events, it is obvious that in its policy toward the Russian revolution the Wilson Administration displayed much greater political blindness than the Russian imperial government of Catherine II which, having proclaimed “armed neutrality,” supported the young Republic of the United States. “What do you think of treating Russia as China was treated?”² asked David Rowland Francis, the U.S. Ambassador in Russia, in a letter to Secretary of State Robert Lansing. This question, voiced by a diplomatic representative of the United States, reflected both the anti-revolutionary sentiments of the American ruling circles in the epoch inaugurated by the 1917 October Revolution in Russia and their colonialist designs.

Striving to justify the hostile attitude taken by the Wilson Administration to the socialist revolution in Russia, American propaganda accused the Soviet government of “exporting revolution,” and put forward the notorious thesis about the “red danger” (conveniently forgetting the slogan of the American revolution about the expansion of the zone of freedom).

The new social system born in Russia at the height of World War I inscribed the slogan

¹ W. Williams. *American-Russian Relations. 1781-1917*, N. Y., 1952, p. 105.

² *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia*, Vol. I, p. 266, Washington, 1918.

"Peace to the peoples!" on its banner and saw the deliverance of mankind from war as its historic mission. It should be remembered that the first foreign policy document of the Soviet state was the Decree on Peace which proclaimed wars of aggression the greatest crime against mankind. The Soviet government appealed to the nations and governments of all the countries that were engaged in the imperialist war to conclude a just democratic peace. Lenin declared: "We reject all clauses on plunder and violence, but we shall welcome all clauses containing provisions for good-neighbourly relations and all economic agreements; we cannot reject these."¹ Such, from the very outset, was the approach of the Soviet state to the problem of relations with the outside world, thereby paving the way for peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation with other countries. The principle of peaceful coexistence between states with differing social and political systems became a major principle of Soviet foreign policy.

Propaganda hostile to Soviet Russia alleged that the struggle of the Soviet government for peace in the first year after the revolution was an act of desperation, and reflected the necessity to defend the country against powerful external and domestic enemies. History proved, however, that the promotion of the idea of peaceful coexistence by the Soviet government was not a tactical move but a fundamental principle, based on Lenin's theory of socialist revolution.

When Lenin was asked about obstacles to

¹ V. Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 26, p. 255.

peace with America, he answered: "None on our part; imperialism on the part of the American (and of any other) capitalists."¹

Wishing to normalise its relations with the United States, the Soviet government submitted to the American government (May 14, 1918) a detailed plan for the development of economic ties between the two countries. On August 5 of the same year the Soviet government informed the US representative that it wanted to live in peace with the United States. And in its note of October 24 to President Wilson the Soviet government once again emphasised its readiness to start peaceful negotiations with the U.S.A. "If you fail to respond," stressed the Soviet note, "we shall draw the obvious conclusion that we are correct in thinking that your government and the governments of your allies want to extract from the Russian people both a monetary contribution and a contribution in the form of Russia's natural wealth and territory." The Soviet note remained unanswered. The appeal of the 6th All-Russia Extraordinary Congress of Soviets of November 8, 1918, to the powers of the Entente, containing the proposal to initiate peace negotiations, also met with no response. Some 150 years prior to these events King George III of Britain dispatched his troops overseas to strangle the young republic of the United States. Now roles were changed. On the orders of the President of this same republic, American expedition forces were landing in the ports of Northern Russia with the aim of destroying the young Soviet Republic.

However, the interventionist policy of Presi-

¹ V. Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 30, p. 366.

dent Wilson was opposed by wide sections of the American public. The attitude of many Americans towards the Russian Revolution found expression in a powerful protest movement against the imperialist policy of intervention. A mass meeting of workers, held in Seattle in December 1917, adopted a resolution in support of the Russian proletariat. The resolution also stressed the necessity of spreading true information about the October Revolution. The movement against the anti-Soviet intervention, which was launched under the slogan "Hands off Soviet Russia!", was supported by wide sections of the American public. The working people of America expressed their sympathy for the peoples of Russia through numerous petitions of protest, demonstrations of solidarity, and also by refusing to load arms for the interventionist forces and the internal counter-revolution. On May 1, 1919, the day of international proletarian solidarity, mass demonstrations were held throughout the United States under the slogans "Stop the intervention in Soviet Russia!", "Let us help Soviet Russia!"

The movement of solidarity with the Russian revolution developed further after the formation of the Communist Party of the United States. The first major campaign launched by the American Communists in September 1919, was the mobilisation of American workers to protest against the blockade of Soviet Russia and fight for an end to the intervention. On January 13, 1920, the workers of Milwaukee called on President Wilson to pull the U.S. troops out of Russia and establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Republic.

The democratic press in America widely debated the legality of the U.S. government's anti-Soviet intervention which had not been approved by Congress. The League of Friends of Soviet Russia which was established in June 1919, stressed that the Soviet government expressed the will of the overwhelming majority of the population. The League drew up a special petition which urged the U.S. Congress to lift the blockade against Soviet Russia, stop the intervention and suspend all support for the internal counter-revolutionary forces. The petition also appealed to Congress to help promote a genuinely democratic foreign policy in keeping with the traditions of the American Revolution.

The mass campaign against the intervention was one of the factors which led to the U.S. government withdrawing its troops from Russia; at the same time it confirmed the viability of the democratic traditions of the American people. Striving to neutralise the ideological impact which the Leninist foreign policy programme, outlined in the Declaration on Peace, had on American public opinion, President Wilson came out with "The Fourteen Points" on the post-war structure of the world. The tone of this document differed noticeably from the foreign policy statements of the previous epoch when imperialism enjoyed undivided dominion throughout the world. The moral and political impetus of the socialist revolution in Russia forced the U.S. ruling circles to remember the old "values" of the American Revolution which the straightforward expansionists of the 1890's had been in such a hurry to forget. It goes without saying that Wilson's interpretation of Ame-

rica's old foreign policy principles also bore the imprint of the evolution which these principles had undergone in the previous years. Nevertheless, the U.S. President deemed it necessary to dwell in his statement on the principle of self-determination, on the rejection of secret diplomacy, etc.

Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau, Wilson's partners at the Paris Peace Conference which terminated World War I, displayed an attitude of placid cynicism towards the democratic rhetoric of "The Fourteen Points." In general, Clemenceau was of the opinion that Wilson "spoke like Jesus Christ while acting like Lloyd George." In the businesslike atmosphere of confidential discussions the leaders of the victorious powers not only forgot the principle of rejecting secret diplomacy, but also ignored the principle of self-determination. Thus, Japan received the Shantung Peninsula of China, and the former German colonies were divided up between the victors. William Williams, a specialist on the subject of U.S. foreign policy, points out that "though it avowed this principle, the actions of America in the realm of foreign affairs did not follow this pattern. Hence it was not surprising, as Wilson's actions became apparent, that many peoples of the world felt misled by Wilson's slogans about self-determination."¹

The revolutionary unrest which enveloped many countries of the world, served to encourage the imperial powers in their attempts to retain and consolidate their colonial empires. The

¹ W. Williams. *Op. cit.*, pp. 94-95.

United States sought to evolve a policy which would enable it to make the most effective use of American aid to counter its European and Japanese rivals, and the world revolutionary movement. The Republicans who came to power in the 1920's, proclaimed an "isolationist" policy which combined the old imperialist policy of Roosevelt-Lodge-Beveridge with the highflown rhetoric of President Wilson. Taking advantage of the economic superiority of the United States, they demanded an "open door" status for American business throughout the world, and at the same time lectured the rest of the world on the correct interpretation of the norms of international ethics. Warren Harding, who was elected President in 1920, declared: "In the spirit of the republic, we proclaim Americanism and acclaim America."¹

At the same time the United States, acting with the habitual despotism of the man who runs the show, did not apply the rules of international behaviour it was preaching to Latin America. The countries of this continent were denied the "right to revolution," and the property of the U.S. monopolies in these countries was vigilantly guarded by American marines. In 1926 the United States launched an intervention against Nicaragua. President Calvin Coolidge cynically declared that in Nicaragua the U.S.A. was no more at war than a policeman was at war with a passer-by. American representatives claimed that, in general, U.S. interference in the affairs of Latin America was, allegedly,

¹ Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard. *The Rise of American Civilisation*, N. Y., 1930, Vol. II, p. 682.

not military intervention but action aimed at "setting an example of justice!"

The monopolies which gained added power under the Republican Administration, launched with great enthusiasm on the economic development of the world. All in all, between 1920 and 1932 the United States invested 11,600 million dollars overseas. The imperialist states which could not equal the U.S.A. in economic might were beginning to dream of closing the door in the face of this American onslaught. The conflict between Japan and America for domination in China and in the Pacific basin as a whole was especially serious.

In 1930 the volume of American investments in China ran to 160 million dollars. The U.S. monopolies had penetrated all the branches of China's economy. American capital began to play a significant role in Chinese banks, the municipal services, shipping and the oil and tobacco industries. The American corporations strove to monopolise the Chinese market. In the late 19th century the United States held third place in China's trade; by the early 1930's America moved up to first place in China's list of trading partners. The average annual volume of America's trade with China in 1920-30 stood at 250 million dollars. China became a major exporter of tungsten, antimony and other raw materials to the United States.

It goes without saying that this did not satisfy America which had much greater things in mind. Thus, the former U.S. Vice-Consul in Hankow wrote in the 1930's that the potential possibilities of the Chinese market were sufficient to enable such American corporations as

General Motors, General Electric, Baldwin Locomotive Works, and United States Steel, to operate at full capacity for several decades. It is thus easy to understand why the U.S. monopolies gave such careful attention to the problem of China. In the 1930's the United States, like other imperialist powers, kept its troops on Chinese territory: in Peking, Tientsin, and Shanghai. Early in 1937 America's Asian fleet boasted 44 warships, 13 of which were stationed in Chinese waters.

Japan sought to counter the Open Door Policy by resorting to military-political methods of struggle and creating an exclusive sphere of influence in China dominated by Japanese capital. Between 1931 and 1933 the Japanese militarists occupied Manchuria, and in 1937 launched on a new stage of their aggression against China. The occupation of Manchuria and the establishment of Japanese control over other Chinese provinces was accompanied by a well-planned campaign aimed at squeezing out American capital. The aggravation of Japanese-American contradictions found expression not only in China but also in the Philippines, British Malaya, India, Indochina, Indonesia, and Latin America.

The world economic crisis of 1929-33 increased the tendencies of the U.S. ruling circles to counter the onslaught of their rivals not only with dollars but with guns as well. The United States took a number of steps to strengthen its armed forces, and, in particular, its navy. In the decade between 1928 and 1938 the U.S. government spent 4,000 million dollars on the implementation of its naval programme. By

the beginning of 1938 the tonnage of the U.S. navy exceeded 1,613,000 tons, i.e. twice the tonnage of the Japanese navy. Simultaneously, the United States launched on a programme to modernise and rebuild a chain of naval bases in the Pacific Ocean. Speaking in the House of Representatives in 1938, during the debate on a new bill of naval construction a spokesman of the Department of the Navy defined the Aleutian Islands, the Hawaiis, Samoa and the Panama Canal as America's "line of defense" in the Pacific. There were also U.S. bases located outside this "line": in the Philippines, on the islands of Midway, Wake, Guam, etc. The Congress appropriations for defense in 1939 comprised 1,600 million dollars, thus topping the respective 1934 figure three-fold.

The United States nevertheless did not use the military and economic potential at its disposal to stop Japan, despite the fact that the Japanese invasion of China and then Southeast Asia had seriously affected American interests in these areas. Expressing their non-recognition of the Japanese policy of aggression, the U.S. government circles adopted a stand of non-interference in Japanese Far Eastern affairs. In the 30's the policy of non-interference was officially linked with the traditional "prejudice" of the United States against any interference in the affairs of the Old World. However, the situation was not that simple. The adoption of a policy of non-interference in no way meant that the United States had decided to abandon its "world role"; rather this policy was a specific form of struggle by the United States against its imperialist rivals in the

new situation where two social and economic systems existed in the world. The United States reckoned that if the aggressors encountered no obstacles they would, sooner or later, clash with the Soviet Union. This U.S. policy of non-interference was combined with ideological hostility towards the U.S.S.R. and the hope that the active anti-Soviet policy of other countries would tip the world balance of forces in its favor. However these hopes turned out to be without foundation. America was forced to pay a terrible price for its policy of non-interference: in December 1941 Japan declared war against the United States.

By serving to encourage aggression, the policy of non-interference placed the victims of aggression—Ethiopia and China—in an extremely difficult situation. In accordance with U.S. legislation on neutrality the invasion of Ethiopia, undertaken by fascist Italy in October 1935, brought into effect an embargo on the delivery of American arms to these two countries. However, this embargo hit only Ethiopia since Italy had her own war industry.

The government of the United States responded to the outbreak of World War II by proclaiming its neutrality. It was stressed that this policy could be traced back to the days of George Washington. Actually, this policy originated at a much later period—at the end of the 19th century. The well-known publisher and multi-millionaire Henry Luce echoing the imperialists of the 1890's declared in 1941 that the United States must accept wholeheartedly its opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world to turn the 20th century

into the "American Century."¹ This statement did not express an individual opinion: it reflected sentiments which were widespread in certain American circles. The mass media in the United States gave great prominence to the idea of the inevitability of the establishment of a "Pax Americana"—the historical successor of the "Pax Romana" of the distant past, and the "Pax Britanica" of the 19th century.

In his address to the Investment Bankers Association of America (December 10, 1940) Virgil Jordan, President of the National Industrial Conference Board, called the United States the successor of the British Empire. "Whatever the outcome of the war," declared Virgil Jordan, "America had embarked upon a career of imperialism, both in world affairs and in every other aspect of her life."²

The idea of a "Pax Americana" was, in fact, an exaggerated version of the old missionary notions of "manifest destiny" and "American exclusiveness" which the ruling élite had not forgotten. In the epoch of imperialism the Utopian dream of the "American Century" became an ideological concept. In the atmosphere of "unlimited opportunities" which reigned in the United States at the end of the war, this concept became a concrete political programme. "Pax Americana" was based on the idea of the redivision of the world in accordance with the new correlation of forces, the idea that America

¹ Henry R. Luce. *The American Century*, N. Y., 1941.

² John M. Swomley, Jr. *American Empire. The Political Ethics of Twentieth-Century Conquest*, London, 1970, p. 95.

should use its might to fill in the "vacuum." The years of the war saw a major shift of emphasis in the political philosophy of the ruling class—the capitalists: not only was isolationism, in fact, discarded, but regional expansionism developed into global expansionism. The "Pax Americana" ideology had a significant effect on the plans made for the role of the U.S.A. in the post-war period drawn up during the war. The government put its main emphasis on the formation of a huge "military establishment" whose function would be "to police the world."

If, at least initially, the Americans envisaged Britain's participation in the post-war domination of the Anglo-Saxon world, in the course of the war their plans were radically revised. It should be noted that the United States had long made it clear that America had not entered the war for the sake of keeping the British empire intact. In the summer of 1940—a truly desperate time for Britain—the Americans agreed to comply with the requests of the British government for aid provided Britain would in her turn allow the U.S.A. to establish bases in the Western Hemisphere. The dominant role of the United States in the Anglo-American partnership found expression both in the war in Europe and, to a much greater extent, in the war in the Pacific, thereby making possible the future ousting of the British ally from this area of her traditional interests.

The British government which had set itself the aim of retaining the British empire intact, had every reason to follow with apprehension the growing might of its American ally who

was sometimes inclined to play the card of "traditional American anticolonialism" in its political game. By the end of the war the hollowness of this boast had become sufficiently clear—and not only because of its close military cooperation with the colonial powers.

The war years saw a considerable strengthening of America's ties with the British dominions; they also witnessed her growing designs in Southeast Asia. The American government, it should be noted, was opposed to France participating in the liberation of Indochina from the Japanese. President Roosevelt instructed the American military authorities not to recognise the official status of any French mission with the allied command in Southeast Asia. However, China occupied the central place in the U.S. plans for hegemony in the Pacific area.

Support of the Kuomintang regime, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, continued to be the main direction of American policy in China during the war years. However, the existence of a Special Area controlled by the Communists meant that this regime was extremely unstable and the inability of the Kuomintang to wage an effective war against the Japanese kept Washington in a permanent state of anxiety. The extensive economic and military aid which Chiang Kai-shek received from America, did not improve the position of his decaying regime. General Joseph Stilwell, who had made a thorough study of the situation in China, reported to his government that the situation in the country could be rectified only by the removal of Chiang Kai-shek.

The complexity of America's position was aggravated by the conflict between its military and the politicians over the "problem of China." General Stilwell, Commanding Officer of the allied forces in the China-Burma-India theatre of operations, with the interests of "big strategy" in mind, was in favor of an alliance of all political forces in China, including the Communists, in order to defeat Japan. This policy was strongly opposed by Chiang Kai-shek who sabotaged Stilwell's proposals and demanded that the latter be recalled to the United States. Stilwell, on his part, supplied Washington with a steady stream of information on Chiang Kai-shek's inability to resist the Japanese advance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff supported Stilwell's point of view, and sent a memorandum to President Roosevelt (July 4, 1944) listing measures which might avert the collapse of the struggle against the Japanese in China; the memorandum also pointed out that until all of China's resources, including the divisions confronting the Communists, were brought into play against Japan there was very little hope of China continuing to wage military operations with any measure of effectiveness. President Roosevelt, who had already sent Vice-President Henry Wallace to China (June 1944) to make an on-the-spot study of the situation, was in agreement with this point of view. In his report-back Henry Wallace has stressed the gravity of the situation in China and the necessity to take urgent measures. On August 18, 1944 Roosevelt appointed General Patrick Hurley his personal representative at the Kuomintang headquarters.

The arrival of the American mission in China

coincided with growing speculation in Chung-ching, the Kuomintang capital, about the nationalistic trends in the communist leadership. P. Vladimirov, who was in the Special Area (Yenan) at the time, noted in his diaries that Mao Tse-tung and his associates were firmly convinced of the inevitability of a rapprochement between the U.S.A. and Britain, on the one hand, and the Special Area, on the other, in view of the obvious instability of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Mao hoped to receive arms and oust Chiang Kai-shek. At the same time he intended to use the recognition of the Special Area by the United States and Britain to exclude any effective Soviet participation in the solution of the Far Eastern problem. "With the assistance of the U.S.A. and Britain," wrote P. Vladimirov, "Mao hoped to acquire the strength necessary to establish his control over all of China and wage a policy which would promote his private ambitions alone."¹ These developments did not remain unnoticed at the American Embassy in Chung-ching. On Mao's request a group of American observers, consisting of army officers and diplomats, arrived in the Special Area in the summer of 1944.

Mao Tse-tung held a series of meetings with the Americans in Yen-an. According to John S. Service, who was in China at the time, Mao's nationalistic sentiments were an open secret to the Americans. According to John S. Service Mao Tse-tung in his report stressed that Ameri-

¹ P. Vladimirov. *China's Special Area, 1942-1945*. APN Publishing House, Moscow, 1973, pp. 302-303.

ca and China supplemented each other, and that in China the Americans would always find both a market for their goods and a sphere of capital investment. Confidential contacts with Mao's associates convinced the American representatives that it was possible to use Mao's nationalism to further American interests and isolate the Chinese revolutionary movement from the U.S.S.R. The supporters of a pro-Maoist reorientation of U.S. policies believed that pressure could be exerted on Chiang Kai-shek to form a coalition government which would include representatives of the Communist Party of China (C.P.C). The American group of observers recommended the delivery of military equipment to the People's Liberation Army. This, they believed, would strengthen the political ties between the Chinese communist leadership and the United States, and would also lead to the isolation of the Chinese Communists from the U.S.S.R.¹

The participation of Soviet armed forces in the hostilities against Japan was of supreme importance for the strategy of the allies in the Far East. In the summer of 1944 U.S. intelligence estimates described the Japanese Kwang-lung Army as a "large and dangerous force." The American military command feared that troops from Manchuria and China would be transferred to the Japanese islands to repulse the allied landing operation. So the American government was extremely anxious to see that the Soviet Union entered the war with Japan

¹ S. Service. *The Amerasia Papers. Some Problems in the History of U.S.-China Relations*, Washington, 1971, pp. 8, 81, 95.

at the earliest possible date. General Douglas MacArthur told the U.S. Secretary of the Navy that America "should secure the commitment of the Russians to active and vigorous prosecution of a campaign against the Japanese in Manchukuo."¹ And the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the U.S. President of January 23, 1945, noted that "Russia's entry at as early a date as possible... is necessary to provide maximum assistance to our Pacific operations."²

In the course of the war political circles in Washington had become increasingly aware of the fact that they had miscalculated in placing their hopes on the weakening of the U.S.S.R. as a result of World War II. The most difficult war in its history had served to consolidate the political cohesion of the Soviet state and strengthen its military might. The U.S.S.R. economy had not collapsed. The decisive influence of the Soviet Union on the course of World War II became increasingly obvious and indisputable. On August 3, 1944, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff came to the conclusion that after the end of the war the United States and the Soviet Union would remain the only first-class military powers.

However the U.S.A. could not forget the "Pax Americana" dream. In March 1944 Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox came out with a statement, claiming that it was necessary for the United States, as the "dominant" naval and air

¹ Ernest R. May. *The United States, the Soviet Union and the Far Eastern War*, *Pacific Historical Review*, May 1955, p. 161.

² *Ibid.*, p. 162.

power in the Pacific, to seize the Japanese mandate territories in this area. And in the summer of the same year this idea received the enthusiastic support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The evolvement of a global strategy was accompanied by the search for the "absolute" weapon which could facilitate the implementation of Washington's hegemonistic plans. At one time the land-based air force was seen as such a weapon. The air force command were putting forward the theory that in the conduct and outcome of the war strategic heavy bombers would play an independent role. In 1944 a group of top-ranking officers at the U.S. Air Force Headquarters drew up a draft plan on the formation of 105 wings with a total complement of one million men. Fifty-eight of the wings were to be based in the Asian-Pacific area. Explaining the post-war strategy of the United States, the American social scientist R. Strausz-Hupe wrote in 1945 that the airplane would become the weapon of "Pax Americana." Many Americans were dreaming of their country's global mission for, by the end of the war, the U.S.A. had developed the atomic bomb—the "indisputably absolute weapon." The enthusiasts of imperial grandeur engaged in the heated discussions of plans which would, at last, help them to see their dream of the "American Century" come true.

V. End of the Omnipotence Illusion

The United States came out of the war as the economically most developed, richest and most

powerful capitalist state. In 1945 the country's gross national income stood at 215,200 million dollars as against 101,400 million dollars in 1940. In the first post-war years the U.S.A. accounted for two-thirds of the total industrial production of the capitalist world, whereas its share on the eve of the war was less than one-half. During the years of World War II the United States built 434 naval and air force bases; and the U.S. Army and Strategic Air Force used 1,933 bases. The United States controlled vast territories throughout the world. In addition to its multi-million-strong army, the United States was the sole possessor of the atomic bomb—the latest and most powerful weapon of destruction. The economic, political and military centre of imperialism shifted from Europe to America.

The unprecedented strengthening of America's international position by the end of World War II gave rise to a wave of expansionist sentiments in the country. The U.S. ruling circles developed an exaggerated idea of the country's resources and possibilities—an "arrogance of power" psychological complex. The most extreme representatives of the country's ruling élite demanded the implementation of a wide-scale programme of expansion abroad, and the pursuance of a tough line towards the revolutionary-democratic and national liberation movements throughout the world. The "American Century" idea was all but officially recognised policy. With the growing influence of the military circles, and the arms manufacturers and their lobbies in the state apparatus on the country's foreign policy the foreign policy plans

of the United States acquired an especially dangerous character. The war had given a powerful impetus to the development of the armaments industry: some 300,000 million dollars were spent on arms production in five war years. This boosted the influence of the military-industrial corporations on the country's economic and political life, and made it more possible for them to control the activities of the state apparatus. Representatives of the war industry headed a number of governmental military-economic bodies engaged in the distribution of government contracts for arms and military equipment. This was accompanied by an unprecedented growth of the role of the military in national policy-making. The interest of both the arms manufacturers and the professional military establishment in the retention of vast budget allocations for military purposes served as a basis for an alliance between them—the formation of a military-state-monopoly grouping or, as it later became known, the military-industrial complex whose sphere of influence steadily expanded in the post-war years, stimulating the development of reactionary trends in the country's domestic and foreign policy.

The United States' claim to the leading role in the world came up against the opposition of democratic forces both at home and abroad. Despite the seemingly boundless opportunities it offered the United States, the "burden of world leadership" turned out from the very beginning to be a back-breaking load. In the first place, the ideas of world hegemony and expansionism did not evoke much enthusiasm among

the American people. After the war the majority of ordinary Americans yearned for a speedy return to peace and did not support overseas adventures. Sympathies for the Soviet people, whom the U.S. military-industrial complex was in such a hurry to declare a potential enemy, were widespread. Public opinion polls held in 1945 showed that the majority of Americans favored cooperation with the U.S.S.R.

The expansionist programme of the United States also encountered obstacles outside the country. A number of states—Denmark, Iceland, Portugal—demanded, and partially achieved, the closing down of American military bases on territories under their control. Submitting to the demand of the Egyptian government, the U.S. Air Force withdrew from the Cairo base in 1946. Under the pressure of public opinion in the countries of Latin America, the United States was forced to leave most of its bases in Cuba, Peru, Brazil and the Galapagos Islands. America's position in China was also undermined: despite the growing volume of U.S. aid, the Kuomintang regime was experiencing serious difficulties in the struggle against its own people.

In addition to diplomatic and economic measures, the U.S. ruling circles were urgently devising new methods of propaganda in an attempt to stem those forces undermining the international position of the United States. The imperialist reaction countered ideas of socialism, democracy and progress by promoting the ideology of anti-communism. After the end of World War II this "ideology" came to occupy a predominant position in the domestic and fo-

reign policies of the United States. In promoting the myth about the threat of an "international communist conspiracy" and fanning the flames of tension and fear, the reactionary propaganda hoped to stabilise the situation in the country, "discipline" the working people, and force them to exert fresh efforts and make new sacrifices in the name of "national security." At the same time the U.S. leaders were in need of an "ideology for export"—an attractive façade to cover up their expansionist foreign policy.

The Soviet Union, America's main ally in the anti-fascist coalition, became the central target of the "psychological war" unleashed by U.S. reactionaries. Especially active in this respect were the military-industrial circles which hoped that the myth about the "Soviet threat" would help to keep military expenditure at a high level. Colonel William Neblett, a former Defense Department official, noted that "The Pentagon line was that we were living in a state of undeclared emergency; that war with Russia was just around the corner, and that the safety of the nation was dependent on the speedy rebuilding of the lower ranks of Army, Navy, and Air with the Pentagon form of UMT." Colonel Neblett, who was personally acquainted with many of the organisers of the "fear campaign," points out that the Pentagon propagandists "do not believe what they say." Their propaganda has always had the single objective to build a huge conscript professional military force of 10,000,000 men under the command of a professional General Staff.¹

¹ J. Swomley. *Op. cit.*, p. 105.

The anti-communist hysteria, unleashed by the expansionists, had repercussions far beyond the borders of the United States. Anti-communism became America's main ideological export commodity. One of the expressions of this was the "Truman Doctrine" formulated in the President's message to Congress on March 12, 1947. In this message President Truman demanded the adoption of urgent and resolute measures to curb the "spread" of communism in the Middle East, and, among other things, the allocation of 400 million dollars in military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, as well as the dispatching of special American missions to these countries. By April 1948 the United States had spent 337 million dollars in Greece and Turkey.

In his message to Congress the U.S. President also proclaimed that the policy of the United States must support the "free nations" which were resisting outside pressure and thwarting attempts of armed minorities to enslave them. Truman was camouflaging his real meaning by using euphemisms taken from the imperialist political dictionary. Thus, the term "armed minorities" stands for the progressive forces that were struggling in the post-war years against the attempts of the reaction to regain the influence undermined or lost in the course of the war.

However, the essence of the "Truman Doctrine" was that the United States assumed the right to support the forces of reaction against the forces of progress wherever these forces clashed, i.e. on a world-wide scale. In other words, the United States assumed the right to interfere in the internal affairs of other count-

ries, and use armed force in any part of the globe. American foreign policy had in other words outgrown the framework of national strategic interests. President Truman had applied the "Monroe Doctrine" to the whole world.

"Establishment of law and order" was also planned for Latin America—the traditional sphere of U.S. interests. In May 1946 President Truman called for military cooperation between the countries of the Western Hemisphere. And in September 1947 the foreign ministers of the American states, at their conference in Rio de Janeiro, signed a treaty on the joint defense of the Western Hemisphere. This treaty committed the contracting parties to render each other mutual assistance in order to repel the "threat of international communism."

The launching of a policy of global counter-revolution inevitably meant the revision of a major U.S. foreign policy principle which had taken firm root in the country since the days of Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln: the tradition of non-participation in permanent military and political alliances outside the boundaries of the Western Hemisphere. On June 11, 1948 the American Senate passed the "Vandenberg Resolution" breaking with this tradition, and permitted the United States to participate in regional and other agreements. The year 1949 saw the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) which was followed in the 1950's by the creation of a number of other military-political blocs: ANZUS, SEATO, CENTO, etc. This was the structural implementation of the strategy of "containing communism" over a vast geo-

graphical area stretching thousands of miles from the United States. However, the policy of "containment" was not restricted to the setting up of a "cordon sanitaire." The struggle of imperialism against the world revolutionary process developed in all the continents. The United States' policy towards the national liberation movements, which developed in the post-war period, was based on its plans to "contain communism." It was indeed ironical that the struggle against the national liberation movement of the colonial peoples should be led by the United States—the first colony to gain its sovereignty and independence.

According to Professor Tom J. Farer of Columbia University, the United States never understood the nature of the struggle for national liberation and social revival which was unfolding in the countries of the Third World. As a result, American policy was antagonistic towards the revolutionary changes in the Third World. Whatever the reasons for its action, concludes Tom J. Farer, it remains a fact that the United States supported the most odious regimes, such, for example, as the Batista regime in Cuba. The national liberation movements in the countries of the Third World were opposed by definite social forces, successors to the 19th century expansionists, who enjoyed the firm backing of the military-industrial complex. And it is precisely these forces, to quote J. Swomley, a critic of expansionism, that "thwart political or social change."¹ It is these forces that struggle against the national aspira-

¹ J. Swomley. *Op. cit.*, p. 230.

tions of the colonial peoples. The reactionary monopoly groups strive to keep the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America within the orbit of the capitalist system, and ensure for themselves military bases, markets, and sources of raw materials.

Demagogically flaunting their "historical anti-colonialism," the U.S. ruling circles strove to fill in the "vacuum" which the collapse of the old colonial empires had allegedly created. In other words, they strove to enforce control over the countries which had thrown off the fetters of the "old" colonialism. The neocolonialist policy of American imperialism was complicated by internal contradictions. Thus, in his book *The Might of Nations* the American political scientist J. Stoessinger points out that the efforts of the United States to involve both the colonial and anti-colonial states in its anti-communist defense system have placed America in an ambiguous position because close support of the countries waging an anti-colonialist struggle could jeopardise her alliance with the colonial powers within NATO. And vice versa, America's alliance with the colonial powers evoked mistrust and hostility on the part of the former colonies. In order to dispel the mistrust of the emerging nations and bring them over to its side the American government resorted to the following manoeuvre. On January 20, 1949, President Truman announced a programme of technical aid to the developing countries (the so-called fourth point). In essence this was a propaganda move. Initially, the modest sum of 45 million dollars was allocated for the implementation of the "fourth point." And in 1953

the "technical aid" programme was, in fact, replaced by an armaments programme.

The United States pursued its neocolonialist policy behind a whole system of propaganda devices, such as the widely publicised, although very dubious, international "philanthropy" that was intended both to camouflage America's colonialist plans and to present it as an "anti-colonialist" power which expressed full solidarity with the aims of the national liberation movement. Typical in this respect was the statement made on May 7, 1954 by John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, during President Eisenhower's first term in office. "The United States, as the first colony in modern history to win independence for itself," said John Foster Dulles, "instinctively shares the aspirations for liberty of all dependent and colonial peoples. . . . We do not seek to perpetuate Western colonialism."¹ Suffice it to recall the role played by Dulles in knocking together imperialist blocs, in promoting the "Eisenhower Doctrine" and other measures directed against the attempts of the peoples of the Third World to liberate themselves, to realise the true worth of these solemn declarations.

The "theory of vacuum," put forward by the American expansionists at the end of World War II, in actual fact served as a new, improved edition of the old and much too frank (and therefore unsuitable for our times) declarations of the imperialists of the end of the century. Aware of the imminent collapse of the old colonial empires of Britain, France, Holland and Belgium, the ideologists of American expansio-

¹ R. Morris. *Op. cit.*, p. 180.

nism spoke of the danger of a "vacuum" forming on the territory of their former colonies. Who then, in the opinion of these ideologists, was to fill this "vacuum"?

Professor Stephen Possony, well-known for his close ties with the military-industrial complex, put forward the idea of "the transformation of the old colonial empires into voluntary inter-regional associations." In his view, the colonies which had gained their independence, should "voluntarily" agree to continue military economic and political cooperation with their former parent states. "In the present period," stressed Professor Possony, "the right course for the West is not to retreat or 'get out,' but to find acceptable solutions in order to stay."¹

This was the policy the Western powers, strictly speaking, followed. However, while many of them nevertheless had to "get out" (although retaining in a partial, or sometimes considerable, degree their former positions), the United States stayed. After the war America not only retained her colonial possessions but, by filling the "vacuum" created by the collapse or weakening of the old colonialists, gained control of many islands in the Pacific Ocean, as well as Taiwan, South Korea, and South Vietnam. The United States strengthened its position in Thailand, the Middle East, and Africa. The old colonialism was replaced by neocolonialism—a policy of retaining colonial domination in a veiled form. This was the final stage of the process which turned the former British colony into a power possessing its own colonies.

¹ *The Idea of Colonialism*, N. Y., 1958, pp. 42-43.

The vast colonial empire of the United States, dispersed throughout the world, has retained some of the old, classical features of direct colonialism where the possession of colonial territories was "legalised" and officially put on record. However, this empire is on the whole camouflaged and invisible, being based not on the juridical possession of territories but on America's actual domination of or predominant influence in these countries. The neocolonialist domination of the United States rests on the following main factors: the expansion of American capital backed up by the strategy of permanent intervention and the system of aid programmes, the strengthening of Washington's political position in the post-war period in the most important parts of its present empire, and, lastly, the network of U.S. military bases flung far and wide throughout the world.

The system of America's post-war foreign policy alliances and agreements concluded with other states envisages the use of U.S. armed forces to "defend" 43 countries of the world. In 1960-70 from one to one and a half million American servicemen were permanently stationed abroad.

According to Professor J. Swomley, the Pentagon maintains some military presence in at least 68 foreign countries and has 432 major military installations overseas; the American Navy patrols every ocean, and there are military missions on every continent. The American business community is the decisive economic factor in many countries around the world. Professor Swomley shows how anti-communism has been used to justify the development of a

"Pax Americana" and a foreign policy that suppresses social change.

The methods used by the United States to enforce its neocolonialist policy were largely borrowed from the arsenal of 19th-century expansionism, but were applied with greater flexibility. The policy pursued by the military-industrial complex in the Third World combined, as it were, the Open Door Policy with the "big stick" policy of Theodore Roosevelt. In other words, it combined the vast economic possibilities of the United States with the systematic use of armed force.

As a rule, the military-industrial complex combined the use of armed force with economic enticement. Military intervention was often preceded by economic penetration and aid which were accompanied by political intrigues. This enabled the United States to strengthen its position in the given country, create an intelligence network, set up espionage centres and military bases. Military intervention, which was usually depicted as "aid in the struggle against communism," was accompanied, as a rule, by promises of economic blessings designed to appease the population of the countries which had fallen victim to aggression. In his book *The Secret Team* F. Prouty gives a detailed description of C.I.A. special operations, including acts of aggression against Cuba, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos and other countries. The author of the book—an intelligence officer—regards the American aggression against the people of Vietnam as the culmination of the subversive activities of the U.S. secret services.

Anti-communism is widely used to justify

American neocolonialism and the interference of the imperialists in the internal affairs of the developing nations. Reactionary regimes have also frequently resorted to the fabrication of ever new allegations about communist "subversive activities" in order to receive American aid. However, in actual fact, the "defenders of freedom against communist imperialism" have always served the interests of big business, protecting its overseas investments and profits.

There is a direct connection between the stationing of U.S. troops overseas and American economic expansion. Let us cite but a few of the most eloquent examples. The first American servicemen arrived in Thailand in 1950. Eighteen years later their number already stood at some 50 thousand. U.S. business activities in the country grew correspondingly: in 1969 American investments in Thailand had increased 13-fold as against the 1961 figure. In 1965 twenty-five American firms with a capital of 41 million dollars were operating in South Korea where, according to Professor Swomley, 50,000 U.S. troops were stationed.

The neocolonialist nature of the policy pursued by the U.S. military-monopolist circles, which, according to the ironical observation of General de Gaulle, have an aversion for every form of colonialism except their own, found vivid expression in their aggressive policy towards Vietnam. The official legend claims that the United States launched its armed intervention in Southeast Asia in order to "defend" South Vietnam against "communist aggression" from the north. However, President Eisenhower, addressing a conference of state governors on

August 4, 1953, i.e. ten months before the People's Army of Vietnam routed the French forces, was more frank. "Now let us assume that we lost Indochina," reasoned he. "If Indochina goes, several things happen right away. The peninsula... would be scarcely defensible. The tin and tungsten... from that area would cease coming." So when the United States voted 400,000,000 dollars to help that war, he continued, it chose the cheapest way to prevent the occurrence of something that would be of a most "terrible" significance to the United States, its security, power and ability to get certain things it needed from the riches of the Indonesian territory and from Southeast Asia.¹ It is no secret that the United States helped finance the French military operations, and that John Foster Dulles even offered to give the French government two atomic bombs to enable its troops to hold Dien Bien Phu.

But that is not all. Hanson Baldwin, the well-known American military observer, wrote that whoever dominates Vietnam will eventually control most of the Indonesian archipelago. In his view, the domination of Vietnam would also guarantee American influence in the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa and Japan, and would open up possibilities for the strengthening of America's strategic position in Pakistan, India and Southeast Asia.² *The New York Times* correspondent C. L. Sulzberger added a political angle to Baldwin's strategic considerations empha-

¹ *Political Affairs*, July 1964, p. 23.

² *The New York Times Magazine*, February 21, 1965, p. 9.

sising that the world implications of Washington's policy in Vietnam were immense and far transcended this "tattered land." Sulzberger linked the outcome of the struggle in Vietnam with the prospects of the national liberation struggle in other areas of Asia, as well as in Africa and Latin America. If the United States can eventually stabilise South Vietnam, he stressed, chances of stability elsewhere will be enhanced.¹

The conclusion drawn by the prominent American historian G. Kolko is characteristic. "Ultimately," he wrote, "the United States has fought in Vietnam... to extend its hegemony over the world community and to stop every form of revolutionary movement which refuses to accept the predominant role of the United States in the direction of the affairs of its nation or region."²

The aggression in Vietnam is not the only example of the attempts of U.S. monopoly capital to halt the process of liberation. In 1957, when the failure of the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt clearly showed the inability of colonialism to keep the Arab nations in bondage, the U.S. government announced the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine, which served the purpose of justifying American intervention in the countries of the Middle East. This doctrine justified the suppression of the national liberation movement of the Arab people and ensured the interests of the United States. Proceeding from this doctrine, the United States launched

¹ *The New York Times*, March 24, 1965, p. 42.

² G. Kolko. *The Roots of War*, Boston, 1970, p. 132.

an armed intervention against the Lebanon in July 1958.

The interest of the American ruling circles in the Arab countries became obvious long before the announcement of the "Eisenhower Doctrine." After the World War I the U.S. monopolies had seized key positions in the production of Middle East oil. After World War II the United States stepped up considerably its penetration into this important strategic and economic area. To assuage public opinion in the Arab countries extensive publicity was given to the legend of "American anti-colonialism." John Foster Dulles who had visited these countries in 1953, emphasised that the United States must discard the appearance of giving any support to colonialism in the Middle East. There were, he admitted, deep suspicions of the United States in this area, because of America's association with Britain and France in the Atlantic Alliance. America must therefore, he said, make it clear that she had no intention of defending the old colonial interests of Britain and France.¹ This marked the beginning of a policy of flirtation with the Arab countries which was accompanied by demagogic statements criticising the "old colonialism" of Britain and France.

John Foster Dulles unceremoniously put an end to these friendly overtures the minute it became clear that Cairo was reluctant to play the role of a satellite. The policy of the Egyptian government, which was to develop relations of friendship and cooperation with all sta-

¹ R. Churchill. *The Rise and Fall of Sir Anthony Eden*, L., 1959, p. 233.

tes, including the countries of the socialist camp, evoked indignation in Washington. To "teach Egypt a lesson" the United States resorted to economic blackmail. On July 19, 1956, Dulles notified the Egyptian ambassador in the United States that the American government had changed its plans and no longer intended to participate in the implementation of the Aswan project. The American historian Herbert Feis has admitted that Dulles wanted to teach a lesson not only to Egypt but also to other governments which maintained friendly relations with the U.S.S.R.¹ The American démarche was of a provocative nature, and was clearly aimed at increasing tension in the Middle East.

So we see that the United States had adopted an openly hostile attitude towards Egypt even before July 26, 1956, when President Nasser announced the decision of the Egyptian government to nationalise the Suez Canal Company.

And although the Eisenhower Administration dissociated itself from the 1956 Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt the Zionist circles in the United States supported Israel's aggressive claims and exerted powerful pressure on the White House. The Zionists and the pro-Israeli lobby in general are extremely powerful in the United States. And it was by no means accidental that in 1948-69 Israel received more than 1,000 million dollars in loans and free subsidies under the U.S. government programme of economic and military aid alone.² If we add the subsidies received by Tel

¹ *Foreign Affairs*, July 1960, p. 599.

² *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1970, p. 771.

Aviv from the Zionist and pro-Israeli organisations in the United States, the total sum of American economic aid to Israel will run into 4-5 thousand million dollars. Late in 1970 the U.S. Congress allocated another 500 million dollars in military aid to Israel, and in June 1971 the American government appropriated an additional 300 million dollars for this purpose.

This support encouraged the Israeli extremists. It is interesting to note that in outlining Israel's expansionist policy, former Prime Minister David Ben Gurion referred to the fact that at the time when the United States proclaimed its independence of Britain it had not defined its borders precisely. Since those days the United States had considerably expanded its territory until the 3 states had increased to 50. The Israeli expansionists obviously counted on the support of their American lobby in the implementation of the historical parallel—the plan to create a "Great Israel."

VI. The National Liberation Movement: For or Against?

The national liberation struggle enjoys the powerful support of the socialist countries and the world revolutionary working-class movement. The achievement of national independence is no longer the sole objective of this movement. The liberated nations and those who are

still struggling for their independence are asking themselves whether they want to stay within the framework of the social system which all these years has kept them in a state of economic, political and cultural oppression, and whose representatives strive to perpetuate this situation.

The scope and scale of the national liberation struggle differs from country to country. However, taken as a whole, it is increasingly acquiring not only a definitely pronounced anti-imperialist character, but also the features of an anti-feudal, democratic revolutionary movement. The achievement of national independence alone by the former colonial and semi-colonial countries cannot ensure, especially in present-day conditions, the consistent development and completion of the anti-feudal, democratic revolution. In practice the struggle for national liberation in many Asian, African and Latin American countries has begun to develop into a struggle against relations of exploitation, both feudal and capitalist.

This situation is alarming influential circles of monopoly capital. A number of ideologists of capitalism have voiced the fear that a comparison of the socialist and capitalist models of development will not favor capitalism and that this social system will sink in the estimation of the emerging countries. The American economist Professor Gruchy points out that for the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America the U.S.S.R. is an example of how a country can achieve economic maturity in a historically short period of time. A similar view is expressed by Professor Charles Wilber of the

American University in Washington who wrote a special book on the subject — *The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped Countries*. The Soviet Union, stressed Charles Wilber in his book, opened a new chapter in world economic history. It showed the world the first example of rapid economic development, centrally planned and directed; and today this example exercises a deep influence on the emerging nations.¹

The U.S. neocolonialist strategists have mobilised a vast arsenal of ideological, political, economic and military means in order to keep the developing countries within the orbit of the world capitalist system, and “protect” them from socialism.

If the subversive activities of the imperialists in the ideological sphere are aimed at the spiritual disarmament and disorganisation of the national liberation movement, the policy of the United States towards the developing countries (especially in the economic field) is aimed at strengthening the idea of private ownership and harnessing the emerging nations to the world capitalist system. In other words, this is “peaceful” economic penetration, and economic and political pressure, or, to give it another name, “dollar diplomacy” in its contemporary form.

The book *Aid as Imperialism* published in London in 1971 is an excellent analysis of this strategy. Its author, T. Hayter, shows that the aid rendered by the capitalist states to the countries of the Third World has nothing in common with genuine concern for the advancement

¹ Charles Wilber. *The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped Countries*, Chapel Hill, 1969, p. 3.

of the former colonial peoples. T. Hayter points out that in its efforts to adapt itself to the new conditions imperialism uses aid as a means of retaining such a social-economic structure in the developing countries as would promote private investments and the draining of profits from the Third World. The imperialist concept of aid, concludes T. Hayter, is a veiled form of deceit which helps the capitalist classes all over the world to exploit the masses.

Despite all the publicity it is given, American economic aid to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America is not very impressive: some 3,000-4,000 million dollars, i.e. a mere 0.4 per cent of America's gross national product. On the other hand, private investments play a much greater role in the economic expansion of imperialism. A special corporation was set up in the United States to boost private investments overseas. The countries of the Third World account for about one-third of direct U.S. investments overseas, the total of which runs into 70,800 million dollars. The reason is obvious: the annual rate of profit, for example, in the countries of Latin America is, on the average, double that in Western Europe, and in some cases reaches 30-40 per cent.

American private investments strengthen the positions of private capital in the countries of the Third World, while U.S. government "aid" merely paves the way for private investments. By threatening to suspend aid, the American imperialist circles attempt to establish political regimes in the developing countries which will be ready to follow their recommendations. Economic expansion helps the imperialists to estab-

lish control over the process of industrialisation in the emerging countries.

Such is the typical pattern of neocolonialist strategy. This strategy—together with a number of other factors—explains to a considerable degree why the international monopolies still succeed in exploiting a large number of the former colonial and semi-colonial countries.

The American business tycoons cannot disregard the growing resistance of the exploited masses, and so they instruct their theoreticians to elaborate new forms and concepts of neocolonialism. A case in point is the "Alliance for Progress" programme drawn up for the countries of Latin America. Rodney Arismendi, a prominent Latin American communist leader and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uruguay, stressed that the "Alliance for Progress" programme was an expression of the new forms of policy adopted by the imperialists to meet a situation where the anti-imperialist forces were gaining a victory; this is the Latin American version of what the peoples of Asia and Africa defined as neocolonialism.

Despite all the verbiage about "positive co-operation" and "equal partnership," the economic relations between the United States and the Latin American countries are more advantageous to the North American partner and do little to contribute to the rapid economic development of the South American continent. George C. Lodge, a leading member of the staff of the Harvard University School of Business, advised American propagandists in the countries of Latin America not to use the word "capitalism."

For the vast majority of Latin Americans, explained Lodge, capitalism means exploitation, imperialism and abuse. He also quoted one of the American leaders (who, Lodge stressed, was not a Communist) as saying that after 150 years of private initiative, free enterprise and competition, more than 130 million people in Latin America are undernourished, more than 70 million are illiterate, and that the area has the lowest economic growth rate in the Western world.¹

In their propaganda directed towards the countries of Latin America the mass media of the American monopolies gives great prominence to the myth about "communist subversion."

Despite all their efforts, it is becoming increasingly difficult to get people to believe the primitive fabrications about "communist expansionism" and "social imperialism" threatening the Third World. Even a number of bourgeois ideologists admit blatant false nature of such allegations, and ask whether one can really believe that the Russian Communist masterminded the Chinese-Indian and Indian-Pakistani hostilities or the conflicts in Africa.²

One cannot but notice that the talk about "subversion from the left" often serves to cover up subversive activities from the right which are masterminded by reactionaries abroad. The events in Chile are still fresh in our minds. One could however add that American aid played a major role in supporting the anti-democra-

¹ George C. Lodge, *Revolution in Latin America, Foreign Affairs*, January 1966, p. 188.

² *The American Political Science Review*, March 1968, p. 330.

tic, dictatorial regimes in Thailand, Taiwan, South Vietnam, South Korea, South Africa, Nicaragua and Haiti. Jerome Slater, a U.S. specialist on Latin American problems, wrote in one of his works that certain circles in the United States are prepared to cooperate with any anti-Communists in Latin America, ignoring the fact that the most vigorous anti-Communists are also the most vigorous anti-democrats.¹

The extensive development of economic and ideological expansion in the practical politics of contemporary neocolonialism has in no way reduced the significance of the factor of armed force. The role of the military-industrial complex in mapping out the country's foreign policy is growing.

Ignoring international law, the reactionary circles in the U.S.A. have even tried to elevate interference in the internal affairs of other states almost to the level of a principle of international relations. As far back as 1965 the House of Representatives proclaimed any U.S. armed intervention in Latin America, that was carried out in the name of anti-communism, a lawful act. According to the American author John N. Plank, the United States regards certain countries as being of "vital importance," and is prepared to use any means to uphold its economic and political domination in these areas. The device of "preventive intervention," employed by the United States in the Dominican case, could, the author stressed, be "employed again."²

¹ Jerome Slater, *Democracy Versus Stability*, Yale Review, 1966, Winter, p. 179.

² John N. Plank, *The Carribean, Foreign Affairs*, October 1965, p. 38.

Such views were expressed in 1965. By 1972 however Professor E. W. Lefever, a well-known American expert in international relations, in his book *The Ethics and World Politics*, published in 1972, openly justifies the right of the United States to resort to armed force against other countries by reference to America's "special responsibility" for international peace and order. Despite the fact that the defense of national sovereignty is a favorite hobby-horse of official American propaganda, he claims that national sovereignty can be sacrificed in the name of other "values" recognised as being of primary importance by Washington. This is a most convenient viewpoint making it possible, depending on the interests at stake, to rule arbitrarily on what is ethical and what is not and is a viewpoint which can have (and has already had) far-reaching implications.

The intervention in Vietnam was perhaps the culmination of this unscrupulousness (suffice it to recall the conditions in which the notorious "Tonkin Resolution" was imposed on the U.S. Congress) and attendant "arrogance of power." In this instance the military-industrial complex received a free hand both in organising the build-up of military expenditures and in deciding the methods of waging war. However, neither the tremendous military efforts, nor the savage atrocities, such as the Song My massacre, succeeded in bringing the Vietnamese people to their knees.

The aggression in Vietnam triggered off a nation-wide movement in the United States against the war. There were mass demonstrations of protest and many refused to serve in

the interventionist forces. Wide sections of the American public voiced their dissatisfaction with the global policy of counter-revolution which was being imposed on the country by the military-industrial complex.

"The concealment from the American people of the government's real war aims," wrote Professor Swomley, "has led to what the press called a credibility gap... The Vietnam war has been clearly evil. But it has had its good side in the awakening of millions of Americans, including many Christian and political realists, to the dangers inherent in the military-industrial complex. In short, the war in Vietnam has demonstrated, for all the world to see, the American imperialist goals and the harsh brutality of the American military-industrial complex which seeks those goals."¹

While the expansionists, linked with the military-industrial complex, were the custodians and successors of the "imperial tradition," the mass protests against the Vietnam war had much in common with previous democratic anti-war movements. Defending themselves against chauvinist propaganda which accused them of a lack of patriotism, the anti-war protesters pointed out that they were in the good company of Jefferson and Lincoln. Thus, in his criticism of the Vietnam war Senator William Fulbright referred to President Lincoln's famous speech of January 12, 1848, in which he had condemned the Mexican war "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun

¹ J. Swomley. *Op. cit.*, p. 229.

by President Polk.”¹ Senator Fulbright pointed out that after twenty-five years of world power “the United States must decide which of the two sides of its national character is to predominate—the humanism of Lincoln or the arrogance of those who would make America the world’s policeman.”²

Many critics of the Vietnam military adventure linked U.S. Southeast Asian policy with certain social and political factors of American development in the present historical epoch. Speaking at the conference on American militarism, held in Washington in 1969, Professor John Kenneth Galbraith emphasised that in the post-war period the United States had harbored a complex of notions about itself as a super-power in respect to Latin America, Asia and Africa. Addressing the conference, Professor E. Reischauer of Harvard University, the former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, called on the Americans to put an end to the U.S. military presence in the countries of Asia. An unusual form of criticism was voiced by B. Cozier: he called militarism unpractical and unprofitable since, according to his estimates, the killing of one guerrilla in Vietnam cost the United States, on the average, 409 thousand dollars, whereas the entire C.I.A. operation which overthrew the democratic government in Guatemala in 1964, cost a mere 500 thousand dollars. Even if this type of reasoning left much to be desired, the

¹ J. William Fulbright. *The Arrogance of Power*, N. Y., 1966, p. 35.

² J. William Fulbright. *Op. cit.*, p. 246.

figures cited by B. Cozier were indeed impressive.

It goes without saying that imperialism does not fundamentally change and is always associated with neocolonialism and expansion. However, détente restricts considerably its freedom of action, making it more difficult for imperialism to retain its former privileges, camouflage its colonialist policy, and continue its discriminatory economic and political practices. The establishment of normal, equitable relations between the two systems contributes to the struggle against the flouting and violation of the lawful rights of the developing nations. The Indian weekly *Mainstream* pointed out that it was not only the great powers but also the countries of the Third World which stood to gain from détente. This, according to the weekly, was explained by the fact that one of the two greatest powers in the world was a socialist state.

Obviously the U.S. military-industrial complex and all the forces preaching the "arrogance of power" actively oppose détente and strive to reverse the positive changes in international relations. The former N.A.T.O. C-in-C General Ridgeway, a spokesman for the military circles, termed détente the most serious potential threat to the United States. Acting hand-in-glove with the Peking revisionists, the neocolonialists spread various fabrications about "social imperialism" and even a collusion between the "two super-powers." Present-day neocolonialism has at its disposal vast economic and military resources, a ramified and sophisticated propaganda machine, and such a state as Israel,

which is in fact a weapon of the U.S. military industrial complex. The history of the American revolution has shown that when people strive for statehood and national independence, for economic and political equality, they will eventually achieve their objective.

Conclusion

When the British colonies in America rose up in arms against the metropolis, the two sides were so uneven that many people refused to believe in the successful outcome of the struggle. On the one hand, there was the mighty British Empire, on the other, "undeveloped" colonies which had neither arms nor a regular army. The victory of the American colonists was a lesson not only for the British colonialists but also for all those who seek to encroach on the rights and independence of other nations.

When the United States launched its aggressive policy in South Vietnam, Senator Wayne Morse pointed out that the United States had embarked upon an adventure "that was just about 100 years out of date. While Britain, France and the Netherlands were terminating their rule over their Asiatic colonies, the United States began trying to establish its own beach-head on the Asiatic mainland."¹

The sponsors of the Vietnam adventure did not want to give thought to the reasons why

¹ Wayne Morse. *We Must Leave Vietnam*, *The New York Times Magazine*, January 17, 1965, p. 15.

Britain, France and the Netherlands were terminating their domination, to the factors compelling them to take this step. Nor did they ask themselves why the national liberation movement was proving to be more powerful than the most sophisticated weapons and economic resources of the colonial powers. The advocates of the military-industrial complex alleged that the United States was fighting not against the nation-wide popular movements, but against some sort of "aggression" organised by countries which are hostile to the United States. This, however, did not change the basic facts. Oppressed nations have accumulated considerable experience in the struggle against colonialism; and this experience shows that no matter what resistance the colonial powers put up, ultimately they have to withdraw from the territories they had seized. The United States had no alternative but to sign an agreement on the termination of the war in Vietnam and withdraw its forces from that country.

A number of American authors have admitted that the policy of neocolonialism and anti-communism leads to results quite the opposite from the ones desired: the loss of face by the United States and the dissipation of its resources.

Such a development of events is not to the liking of many influential representatives of the ruling class and the professional ideological élite. In this connection we would like to note the criticism of expansionism and interventionism in U.S. foreign policy voiced by such prominent politicians and scholars as William

Fulbright and Wayne Morse, George T. Kennan and Hans Morgenthau.

This criticism is not always consistent, and its representatives are not always able to propose any realistic alternative to the policy which they criticise. However, it is important to stress that a number of prominent American figures regard interventionism and the striving for world hegemony as a hopeless and dangerous policy. Various theories are being put forward—such as “pluralism,” “polycentrism,” “diffusion of power,” etc.—to replace the dogma of American “superiority.”

The policy of global counter-revolution and support for the forces of conservatism throughout the world is inevitably doomed to failure... The United States tried to use its power, but at the same time failed to take into account the limits of America's possibilities in a world which could not be placed under control by one state or alliance. These words belong to the American historian Gabriel Kolko. However, long before this bitter admission was made, back in the days when the young American republic was still spreading its wings, Benjamin Franklin, one of its greatest citizens, issued the sage warning that foreign policy adventures lead domestically to the growth of crime and moral degradation.

A number of American authors call for the revival of the “spirit of ‘76.” The United States, writes Richard Morris, needs desperately to rebuild its image as a country which supports democracy, and to regain its status as a

nation founded on revolutionary principles.¹ The ideals of freedom which in 1776 turned the British colony into an independent state, will show themselves to be stronger than the forces which trample them underfoot.

¹ R. Morris. Op. cit., p. 220.

Б. М а р у ш к и н
США: ПОПРАННЫЕ ТРАДИЦИИ
на *английском языке*
Цена 29 коп.

B. Marushkin.
The American Tradition
What Remains?

Dear Reader,

Novosti Press Agency Publishing House would be extremely grateful if you would complete the following questionnaire and return it to:

Novosti Press Agency Publishing House
13/5 Podkolokolny Pereulok,
Moscow, USSR

We thank you in advance for your co-operation.

1. What is your opinion of the general subject matter of this publication?

2. What is your opinion of it from the point of view of the English language?

3. How long have you been familiar with the publications of the Novosti Press Agency Publishing House?

4. Where did you get this publication?

5. Which aspect of the life of the USSR and the Soviet people would you like to know of?

Your occupation

Age

Sex

Name

Address

You need not give your name and address if you prefer not to.

